The consequences of the visit of the Russian leader to North Korea and the documents signed there are so significant that they can propel the trend of global turbulence. How have Seoul, Beijing and Washington reacted to such a rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang and what will be Moscow’s response to the steps taken by Seoul and its allies?
Seoul’s response
Until a certain point, Seoul was ‘the friendliest of the unfriendly countries’ – the Russian president recently noted in a positive way. As Vladimir Putin said on June 5, 2024, within the framework of the International Economic Forum in St Petersburg, “Russia highly appreciates the refusal of ROK to directly supply lethal weapons to Ukraine”.
However, such a demonstrative rapprochement between Pyongyang and Moscow cannot be ignored by Seoul, especially since the content of the Treaty (which contains a military component along the lines of the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 1961) has turned out to match the worst expectations of South Korean analysts.
Even before the visit, South Korean diplomats hinted to the author that Seoul would definitely respond to such a level of cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, at least for domestic political and reputation reasons. This response would most likely entail boosting Seoul-NATO cooperation to a similar level. The United States, along with its allies and systemic right-wing politicians, are putting pressure on President Yoon Suk Yeol to take a more anti-Russian stance, especially on the Ukrainian track; Seoul is constantly being convinced that since Pyongyang has been ‘proven’ to be aiding Russia, South Korea has the right to provide similar support to Ukraine, despite all possible risks of retaliatory measures and a significant cooling of relations with Moscow.
In a statement on June 20, 2024, former Ambassador to Russia and current National Security Adviser to the President Chang Ho-jin noted: “Four ships, five organisations and eight individuals from third countries, as well as Russian and North Korean organisations involved in the supply of weapons and oil transshipment between Russia and North Korea, are on the list of independent sanctions…We have also included 243 new items to the list of sanctioned goods exported to Russia, bringing the total number to 1,402 items…We plan on reconsidering the issue of military support for Ukraine, as the government has so far maintained the position that it will not supply lethal weapons to this country”.
Chang’s statement, on the other hand, could not but evoke a threatening reply from Moscow. Vladimir Putin almost immediately declared that the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine would be a “very big mistake” and that Moscow would in this case make “the appropriate decisions, which the current leadership of South Korea will most likely not appreciate”. However, the Russian president expressed hope that such a thing would not happen.
There was also a natural exchange of reprimands. On June 21, 2024, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of ROK Kim Hong Kyung summoned Russian Ambassador Georgy Zinoviev to convey Seoul’s official position on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and DPRK from June 19. The vice minister called on Russia to “immediately cease military cooperation with North Korea and comply with UN Security Council resolutions”. He made it clear that ROK, along with the international community, will “resolutely resist any actions that threaten its security”.
Zinoviev said that cooperation between Russia and DPRK is not directed against third countries, complies with the principles and norms of international law and is aimed at strengthening peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Russia is ready to continue to make political and diplomatic efforts to form an architecture of long-term peace and stability based on the principle of indivisible security”, the ambassador stressed.
Meanwhile Seoul slowly began to backtrack. On June 23, 2024, in a speech on the KBS channels, Chang Ho-jin made it clear that the question of whether South Korea will supply lethal weapons to Ukraine will depend on Russia; if it starts sending high-precision modern weapons to North Korea, then nothing will stop South Korea from helping Ukraine. Among the options under consideration are 155 mm artillery shells and air defence systems.
In essence, the parties formally voiced to each other the long-known, informal red lines: South Korea is not to be engaged in direct supplies of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine and Russia is not to be engaged in the development of the North Korean military potential. It is important for Seoul to prevent the supply of dangerous modern weapons and technologies to the North, and North Korean shells (which are allegedly provided to the Special Military Operation) are a nuisance, but not yet a disaster.
It is worth remembering that, despite his high position, Chang still does not have the right to speak on behalf of the state unlike the president, the prime minister and the foreign minister. If such statements were to come from them as well, then it would indeed be a cause for concern. For now, though, one should wait and see, considering how, on the eve of his visit to the United States, Yoon Suk Yeol stated that the Republic of Korea could start supplying weapons to Ukraine if the Russian Armed Forces were to commit an atrocity.
Thus, the point of no return in relations between Moscow and Seoul has not yet been passed, but we are close. The author hopes for the best, as Moscow and Seoul understand that when crossing the ‘red’ line, Russia will also have to take action in response and South Korea may lose its status as ‘the friendliest of the unfriendly’.
China’s position
The reaction to the visit by the Chinese media and government agencies was between neutral and positive; they did provide any statements of judgement and simply noted that this was an important and serious event. The Chinese Foreign Ministry called the DPRK’s desire to develop relations with Russia normal, and the Global Times noted that this cooperation could perhaps even make the United States afraid.
Western media actively wrote that China was not happy with the rapprochement between Russia and the DPRK that Putin’s visit to North Korea and Vietnam was actually anti-Chinese in nature and that having a parallel 2+2 dialogue shows China’s desire to be friends with Seoul, showing its tough stance to Pyongyang.
This is not exactly true. Firstly, coordination between Moscow and Beijing on the Korean issue has always been and is very close. A look at the joint statements on the Korean issue made during Putin’s visit to China is enough to prove this. This means that the essence of Moscow and Pyongyang’s agreements with Beijing was probably discussed in advance.
Secondly, on June 18 negotiations did indeed take place in Seoul. They were attended by senior officials from the foreign and defence ministries of ROK and China in a 2+2 format.
Before the start of the talks, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Lim Soo-suk, believed that “issues of cooperation between Russia and North Korea will be discussed, since dialogue is taking place simultaneously with the scheduled visit of the Russian president to North Korea”. Professor of the Hankuk University of Foreign Affairs Kang Jung-young said that “having this dialogue is in itself is a clear signal to North Korea that China will not support Pyongyang’s attempts to create a trilateral bloc with Beijing and Moscow”.
The Korean approach to the 2+2 format is as follows: representatives of Seoul expressed deep concern to their Chinese colleagues about the visit of the Russian president to DPRK and the deepening of ties between Moscow and Pyongyang amid rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. They stressed that the Russian leader’s visit to North Korea should not undermine peace and stability in the region or lead to the strengthening of military cooperation between the two countries. Additionally, ROK called on China to play a constructive role in ensuring peace, stability and security on the Korean peninsula, emphasising that the deepening of Russian-North Korean military cooperation and its consequences run in contradiction to Beijing’s interests. In turn, China confirmed its unchanged position on the Korean peninsula, expressing its readiness to take an active part in solving the problems of the region.
A ‘bloc’ as a limiting factor
Almost immediately after the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between the Russian Federation and North Korea, the Russian president noted that there were no fundamentally new points in it and that the document was similar to the 1961 treaty, including Article 4 on ‘automatic military intervention’. According to Putin, the provisions of the new Agreement stipulate that military assistance is provided only in case of aggression, and therefore ROK has nothing to worry about, since there are no known plans of the South to attack the North. The Russian president also expressed the opinion that the Agreement would to some extent limit the threat of the crisis on the Korean peninsula entering a ‘hot phase’.
The author supposes that the cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang within the framework of a possible military bloc reduces the likelihood of conflict on the Korean peninsula rather than increases it. The fact that the opposing sides are two serious military blocs reduces the likelihood of an escalation of the conflict, as it could too easily escalate to become nuclear, and neither Moscow nor Pyongyang are suicidal.
One more detail: on the one hand, article 4 of the Agreement is harsher than article 5 of the NATO treaty. On the other, it clearly indicates that a state of war is required for comprehensive assistance, and if we recall the 1961 treaty, then it is worth paying attention to the events of 1968 when Moscow clarified to Pyongyang in which situations military assistance would be cancelled.
We should likely expect a confrontation similar to the Cold War. There will be an arms race, muscles will be flexed, loud statements and minor incidents will take place, but the parties are well aware of the red lines and do not intend to cross them. Being prepared for war, including the development of preemptive strike plans as a way of self-defence in a critical situation, is not the same as the desire to initiate a conflict.
The fate of UNSC sanctions
The demonstrative liquidation of UN Security Council sanctions, which was expected in the West, has still not taken place. Both Putin’s article and the additional decree emphasise cooperation in the fields of education, healthcare and science and maintain that the unjust sanctions should be lifted.
For now, though, Moscow says it will comply with the sanctions it previously voted for.
It is likely that the lifting of sanctions may occur following the next round of escalation because regardless of whether there were actually arms deals or not, the West will still blame Moscow and Pyongyang for colluding and take retaliatory measures.
The appearance of a North Korean labour force in Russia is a sign that a de jure or de facto decision to ignore a part of the sanctions has been made. Price, quality, safety and keeping a low profile are the strengths of North Korean builders, and talks of their employment have been going on for a long time.
Summa summarum, there is a lot of uncertainty in the future and the situation is similar to that described in the book ‘The Guns of August’ by Barbara Tuchman: nobody wanted war, so war was inevitable. However, it cannot be said that the visit of the President of the Russian Federation to the DPRK has significantly aggravated the situation.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Korean Studies Center of the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences