A tale of two Quads: What is India getting into? – MK Bhadrakumar
US President Biden hosts Quad leaders at their first in-person summit, left to right, then-Japanese prime minister Suga Yoshihide, Indian PM Narendra Modi and Australian PM Scott Morrison in the White House on September 24, 2021, amid shared concerns about China’s growing power and behavior. Photo: AFP / EyePress News

The United States’ chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan has dented the credibility of the trans-Atlantic relationship and dealt a body blow to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

These developments add to the already existing frustration in Washington that its European allies disfavor its confrontational Indo-Pacific Strategy. Europe regards China as an economic competitor and “systemic rival,” but prefers the path of engagement and dialogue.

While a breakup of the trans-Atlantic alliance is inconceivable, the centrifugal forces at play are unprecedented. The China-focused policy of the US is contributing to the unraveling of the Western alliance system.

The West Asian Quad (Quad-2), comprising the US, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and India, which President Joe Biden’s administration unveiled two weeks ago, also follows the same format – the US networking with regional partners.

Both Quad-1 and Quad-2 have China in their crosshairs. Both are conceived as “coalitions of the willing.” Both formats have sea power as the dominant paradigm. Both are anchored on the control of the chokepoints in sea lanes – the Malacca Strait and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, respectively.

The Malacca Strait provides sea passage to the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea; the Bab-el-Mandeb strait connects the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Now, it is on the Yemeni island of Socotra, which overlooks the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait, that the UAE and Israel have created an intelligence-gathering base. The UAE has deployed hundreds of troops on the strategic island since May 2018, disregarding the protests by the Yemeni government.

Warships and fighter jets of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy take part in a military display in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Reuters
Warships and fighter jets of the PLA Navy take part in a military display in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Facebook

The island of Socotra is known as the “Jewel of the Gulf of Aden” and is the largest of the archipelago of the same name, which consists of four islands and two islets sitting at a strategic location in the Indian Ocean, off the Horn of Africa, in the Arabian Sea.

Most exports of oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait.

For years, the UAE has been seeking to annex the island, and the collapse of the Yemeni state because of years of instability paved the way for this takeover.

An interesting sideshow here is the UAE’s diplomatic, military and economic competition with Saudi Arabia in Yemen. For the UAE, controlling Socotra means strengthening its commercial and military projection in the Indian Ocean, thus emphasizing its rising inter-regional prestige.

Security analysts estimate that the spy base in Socotra will also be used to monitor Pakistan, especially Gwadar Port. Clearly, Quad-2 impacts the power dynamic in the region.

Israeli media have reported that Socotra Island is attracting a lot of attention from the Israeli security services. It is entirely conceivable that in reality, the base is a US-Israeli project. The US has been making efforts to derail the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which connects Gwadar to Kashgar in Xinjiang.

The Israeli military intelligence website Debka File reported in May that the UAE was also building a new airbase on a volcanic island off Yemen called Perim Island, which will provide the “means of controlling oil-tanker and commercial shipping through the Red Sea’s southern chokepoint and up to the Suez Canal.”

Bruce Riedel, a well-known Middle East expert at the Brookings Institution, wrote in an analysis in May that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had “entrenched their hold on strategic parts” of Yemen and are “unlikely to give up their gains without significant international pressure.”

Saudi soldiers stand in line at an airfield where Saudi military cargo planes land to deliver aid in Marib, Yemen January 26, 2018. Picture taken January 26, 2018. REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser
Saudi soldiers stand in line at an airfield where Saudi military cargo planes land to deliver aid in Marib, Yemen January 26, 2018. Picture taken January 26, 2018. Photo: Agencies

Riedel wrote that the Saudis occupied the province of al-Mahrah, Yemen’s second-largest, which borders Oman, and had 20 bases and outposts in the province now. Al-Mahrah port gives Saudi Arabia direct access to the Indian Ocean.

According to Riedel, Riyadh plans to build an oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province through al-Mahrah to the sea, which would ease Saudi dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for exporting oil.

On the other hand, the UAE’s focus is on Yemen’s strategic islands. Riedel wrote: “The United States should not be a party to the dismemberment of Yemen. It is not too early to quietly put down a marker that if a ceasefire is arranged in Yemen, the Saudis and Emiratis will need to evacuate al-Mahrah, Mayun, and Socotra, and return control to the Yemenis.”

Indeed, given such high stakes affecting the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy to contain China, it is improbable that Washington will ask the UAE, Israel and Saudi Arabia to leave Yemen alone.

Put simply, Quad-1 and Quad-2 are joined at the hip. Given Quad-2’s agenda to monitor China and Pakistan, Washington has thoughtfully invited India to join. Of course, Israel and the UAE also have very friendly ties with India.

However, a few caveats must be added. First, it is 100% certain that whatever the UAE and Israel do in Yemen and the Arabian Sea will have an Iran angle to it. In fact, Iran is under no illusions on that score.

The Tehran Times recently featured an interview with Yemen’s ambassador to Iran. According to the ambassador, it is an Anglo-American condominium that is at work in Yemen and it is only with US backing that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have pursued such an interventionist policy.

Ships taking part in the Malabar exercise in the Bay of Bengal, India, November 3, 2020. Photo: AFP / Indian Navy

The conflict in Yemen has been one of the most brutal wars in the post-Cold War era. Why should India have Yemeni blood on its hands? Equally, Quad-2 has an anti-Iran dimension to it. India-Iran ties can never be the same again if New Delhi teams up with the US, Israel and the UAE in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.

Third, Quad-2 is a major step in boosting the US-Indian quasi-alliance. As the latest developments in Sudan show, a nasty geopolitical struggle is erupting for control of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. For Israel, the great game provides an ideal setting to get embedded in Arab politics. But India needs to be circumspect.

It is not in India’s interests to annoy a host of countries in the region, and outside the region, such as Turkey, Iran, Qatar, China, Pakistan – and even Russia. The bottom line is that the Indian government must explain how India benefits from this joyride in Quad-2.

This article was produced in partnership by Indian Punchline and Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.

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