‘New resources mean new investments, and thus also new jobs and income stabilisation for countries and societies taking up new challenges, which is also stabilising within international relationships’ – these are arguments we can often hear from the renewable energy (RE) supporters.  But this optimistic assumption ignores what the economists call the Rybczynski Theorem and the possibility of the ‘Dutch disease’ in countries gaining rapid growth thanks to the exploitation of rare Earth elements (REE).  That means a threat of sucking up all capital and investment potential by only one sector, with the regression of the others, which could be potentially destabilising.

‘Dutch disease’ pandemic and the patent wars

Obviously, the emergence of a similar asymmetry in the IR as in the case of oil and gas cannot be ruled out.  Enthusiasts try to convince us, that it will be easier to overcome, and thus not threatening with escalation of tensions or permanent domination of a few actors.  And for cyberthreats – they are by no means the domain of RE only, due to the widespread of digitalisation also within of fossil fuels energy industry.  But this in turn indicates another rivalry for the intellectual property rights and access to technology, also cybersecurity one, what has already been disputed in context of RE with participation of China, US and EU at the WTO forum.  Of course, there is nothing to discourage true believers.  At last they can always insist that the critics think ugly about the here and now, while they fight for a bright future.  In a word – it may be dark, expensive and with wars for new resources, but the goal is noble and justifies the means! In fact, there are much more assumptions about what may finally happen, than forecasts on how this could happen.  Another mistake is not distinguishing the geopolitics of the transition itself from the assumed geopolitical changes resulting from it.  Despite the relative multiplicity of studies, no theoretical foundations for the geopolitical analysis of energy transition have been developed so far. 

Winners and losers?

Albeit we can find lists of potentially winners and likely losers as a result of the transition.  The former includes both the most advanced in new energy technologies and in their own shift to RE, as well as countries with REE reserves.  The second group consists mainly of oil and gas exporters whose reserves will become stranded assets in the long run.  Hence, on the lists of winners Sweden, France, Iceland and Finland are together with Uruguay, the Central African Republic and Mongolia.  Also the USA (currently an exporter) and China (the main energy importer) are expected to improve their geopolitical situation as a result of the energy transition.  The list of losers and the most exposed countries seems to be easier to compose, however when using different indexes only some names are repeated, especially Russia, Qatar, Bahrain and Nigeria.  But considering Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates scholars do not agree whether faster monetisation of their resources would not allow them to benefit in time from the changes. Financing of The International Renewable Energy Agency by UAE may indicate that this country has adopted a win-win strategy in relation to energy transformation.

The lack of more extensive research makes it difficult to predict the course of the transition itself, when completely new alliances and new oligopolies may be formed and the role of energy as a weapon may even increase, especially under the pressure of shift to RE and the forecasted new balance of power.  Scholars analysed various scenarios in this regard, all within the framework of ‘VUCA concept’, i.e. assuming that the transitional period will be ‘volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous’.  It is difficult to confront the assumption of greater democratisation, participation and increasing role of NGOs as social and regime effects of shift to RE – with the position of China, going to benefit from transition but not showing any tendency to change own political system.  Therefore, it seems that not only the forecasted new energy order and the IR built on it are uncertain, but also the change itself may cause more turbulence than it advocates would like to admit.  Simply – energy importers interested in changing their position can get the energy transformation program as beneficial for their particular interests, but not its packaging, i.e. the alleged grassroots nature and, in general, the charm of capitalism with a human face and a flower in hairs.  For if you fell for propaganda – shift to RE would be a guarantee of maintaining the global domination of multinational corporations, implemented through the United States.

It is not only about the opposition of current exporters, but also the attitudes of energy consumers and business entities involved in energy generation and distribution, especially large oil and gas concerns.  From the consumer point of view particularly important is what distinguishes the current energy transformation from the previous ones, i.e. the shift from biomass to coal, and then from coal to oil and gas.  Those were related to the increase in demand and consumption of energy, while nowadays the main assumptions of shift to RE is the reduction of consumption, despite the observed further increase in demand. It would also be in line with the deindustrialisation trend in core countries, along with the shift of the dominant economic activity towards services.  This means not only actions to increase efficiency, but also a change of the paradigm, which is one of the foundations of global capitalism.  The global COVID-19 fake pandemic was probably kind of test we will discuss further.   So, not only national states policies really threatened, but also the entirety of global consumers, especially these directly energy excluded.  Because we do not deal with attempts to increase energy efficiency, which are the most widely talked about, but above all with a paradigm shift, change within the foundations of global capitalism. It is about the end of Fordist consumerism.

Three speed transformation

In the context of IR, it should be recognised that global energy consumption is not equally distributed.  The largest consumer is the Asia-Pacific region (43% in 2017), with a clearly greater share of coal in the energy mix.  North America is second (21%), mainly oil-consuming, but also with a significant share of gas.  And in the third place is Europe (15%), also with a predominance of oil and natural gas, but the most interested in achieving goals like the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions through the increase in the share of RE in the energy mix, with a simultaneous reduction in consumption and an increase in efficiency at least at 32.5% by 2030.  So far, the European transformation has been made with the assumption of natural gas as a transition fuel.  An important element of this process is the German Energiewende, currently being sharply reformulated because of the Russian-Ukrainian war.  However even earlier this concept was criticised not only from RE perspective, but emphasising Jarvis’s dilemma, that securing one’s own energy security may violate the energy security of another country.

At the same time when the EU wants to accelerate its transformation even at the expense of screwing down the radiators (in our homes) and turning off the light bulbs (also there) -before 2029 energy consumption in North America is expected to increase by as much as 19%, despite relatively flat demand in the US.  Regardless the assumption of obtaining up to 50% of the RE share, oil and gas (including shale gas) are to remain the transition fuels for the United States (Fuentes et al., 2020, pp. 27-28).  The US declares priority of national security, including energy self-sufficiency still based mainly on fossils.  It is not known whether the US will decide to maintain the position of a global leader by redefining its participation in shift to RE and / or in the field of nuclear technology, which may also be a source of tensions in IR.  In turn China shows a growing interest in energy diversification, but with the primacy of maintaining growth of GDP and industrial production.  In April and October 2021, China committed to reduce carbon consumption and carbon emissions by 2040 and to increase the market share of new energy vehicles.  However, sceptics consider the revised Nationally Determined Contributions targets insufficient and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement, which appears to be quite in line with Beijing’s actual intentions.

Short comparison shows the threat of different speeds of energy transition, which can be a serious threat to international security.  Especially because of possibly incompatible priorities, when for EU energy transition in an element of security policy; for China a growth factor, and for the US a method protection of own hegemony position.

Climate is a new bubble

Let us also not forget that the real actors of international relations are national and transnational corporations, as their financial power exceeding the GDP of many states and their strategies influence international security.  In the market reality an economic argument should be decisive, as an assumption that RE will be the fastest and most intensively developing energy sector in the next decades, what means an increase in profits for those involved in the process.  ‘Ecology – it’s a new bubble!’ – even the famous Gordon Gekko learned.  This, as with any Ponzi scheme, also means increased profits for those involved in the process at the right moment.

In particular, in case of European companies, and to a lesser extent American one, ‘for’ also speaks growing social pressure, a changing cultural environment and geocultural shift, also within the companies themselves.  Despite the apparent contradictions in the business and management models typical for oil and gas concerns, and the attitudes associated so far with RE – Royal Dutch Shell, Equinor, Total and ENI have already announced their transformation into ‘energy transitions companies’.  This involves diversifying investment and research packages and declaring a leading role in shift to RE. The American ExxonMobil and Chevron, British BP and Brazilian Petrobas have reacted with a delay to the new trend, which can be associated with the policies of their states and with the access to larger oil reserves.  BP like the UK, previously not having clear strategy for RE, with time even began to use solar panels for its internal needs.  It is an evident financial leverage reducing the element of investment and technological uncertainty.  The big oil and gas companies react mainly to ‘offers which they could not refuse’, and historically never cared about public opinion about themselves.  This had historical impact on international security, with the most infamous examples of oil concerns’ influence on The 1953 Iranian Coup D’état and The Sues Crisis 1956.  Also contrary to the ‘Olsonian‘ principle of treating government and international regulations as hindering business activities – according to the ‘Stiglerian‘ approach some regulations (in this case – the climate one) could be supported as a mechanism of gaining a competitive advantage.  Big energy corporations are not victims of the RE revolution – only its engines and beneficiaries, just like other globalists.

In fact, in the whole of Western geoculture, in force there is a principal: ‘Be original and independent = repeat the same as everyone else!’.  This can be clearly seen in the example of climate change.  Although it has been one of the main elements of geoculture for several years, the leading media and show business topic, a convenient justification for the energy policy of governments, and a source of great corporate profits – it is still presented as an almost counter-cultural element.  And no one notices that if a climate strike is organized by employers themselves – it is not a strike, but a business…  Business, of course, for global capitalism. And a threat to international security.