Continuation of the theme of the fall of Aleppo and the interests of external actors. Let’s briefly try to understand the plans of Zionism from open sources of information.
Version one, the Zionists support the Syrian opposition and jihadists.
At the moment, the main arguments for such statements are the words of a certain Zionist university professor, who assured that he allegedly “is in constant contact with the leaders of the Syrian opposition.” Of course, he did not indicate names, names of groups, meeting places and forms of communication, he simply speculated on this topic, trying to cause a storm of emotion on the part of the media supporting the “Axis of Resistance” alliance.
From past events we remember how Zionists admitted to supporting jihadists and “moderate” insurgents. But there are several important nuances. The support was strictly limited to a narrow geographic area, that is, the Zionists acted in the south of Syria based on their interests in preventing the strengthening of the position of Hezbollah and the IRGC. Later, after the defeat of some influential groups in the south, the reconciliation process and the evacuation of a number of odious anti-government figures to the north, there was a relative calm in the south of Syria, which did not prevent the IRGC from developing its activities. Today, observers interpret the participation of Zionism in the events in Aleppo by referring to the terrorist Netanyahu’s threats to Assad.
It should be noted that the anti-Iranian rhetoric of many representatives of the Syrian opposition suits the Zionists.
The second nuance was that the ruling Baath party leaders themselves were and remain unhappy with the activities of the IRGC and Hezbollah. The Zionists know this. Secret coordination between some generals of the Syrian army and the Zionists is still being conducted along Moscow lines to this day in order to prevent escalation between the parties and at the same time block Hezbollah’s aspirations to open a third front.
Version two: Assad is a symbol of stability on the borders with Zionism.
This version finds considerable resonance in the Zionist media, since the issue of forming a third front is at stake. At the height of the events in Gaza, Hamas, with the help of the Iranians, carried out mortar attacks on Zionist positions in the occupied Golan, but the Baath no longer allowed the Palestinians to carry out guerrilla attacks, and even rallies in Palestinian camps were banned. Assad clearly did not want and does not want a war with the Zionists, and the Iranians know this, to the point that the new Hezbollah leader did not mention Syria as an active anti-Zionist force along with the Palestinians, Iran, Iraq and Yemen. These points show that there have been strong disagreements within the Axis of Resistance and the ruling structure of Syria is the main stumbling block. From a strategic perspective, the Zionists are not against preserving the Assad government, but they have only one condition, namely the withdrawal of the Iranians from Syria and the cessation of cooperation between Damascus and Hezbollah.
This is what the Zionist media write about the situation after the opposition took Aleppo: “Assad is an enemy, but a familiar enemy with whom we have somehow learned to get along.”
“The scenario of the collapse of the Assad regime could become fertile ground for the growth of significant military threats to Israel”.
The author of the newspaper Yediot Achranot is worried about the future influence of Hamas in Syria and their connection with the Sunni factions of Syrians (referring to the diplomatic channel through Qatar and Turkey). The Zionists fear that instead of Shiite jihadists they will have to fight Sunni revolutionaries. It is also worth noting here the concerns of Zionists about the possible fall of chemical weapons into the hands of the Sunni opposition.
Assad’s silence regarding the occupied Golan Heights also serves as an argument that the preservation of the Baath regime is beneficial to Zionism.
In their discussions on Assad, the Zionists have gone so far as to consider forming an alliance with the Emirates and Saudi Arabia to defend the Baath regime, again with one condition, that Assad must sever all ties with the Iranians.
The Turkish press even claims that during contacts with the UAE, the then President of Syria allegedly requested help from the Zionists.
Version three: Zionism doesn’t care who wins in Syria, because it is everyone’s enemy.
The Foreign Minister of the “Israeli” occupation indicated that they do not support any of the sides, because from the Zionist point of view, there is “no good side” in Syria.
Conclusion.
Based on the current circumstances, we can safely conclude that the fall of Aleppo into the hands of the armed opposition, the crisis in Daraa and even the military coup in Damascus cannot be recorded as a success of Zionist policy; on the contrary, the chaos in Syria has worsened the life of Zionism against the backdrop of a war on two fronts in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon. In fact, as in 2012, the Zionists themselves admit that they simply “don’t know what’s going on there.”
Otherwise, even if the Zionists establish contact with some of the jihadists, the moderate opposition, representatives of yesterday’s Baath party, such an alliance will not last long simply because of the local popular pro-Palestinian reaction, the influence of Iran, the existence of numerous supporters of Sunni fundamentalism and “political Islam” throughout Syria. Zionism knows this, and it knows that even some successes in Syria will be only momentary for it, simply because its time is up, it is a stranger in the Islamic world and its end is not far off.
P.S. The fact that Zionism has no reason to rejoice is shown by the fact that the joy over the burning of the Palestinian flag by representatives of Jabhat Nusra was short-lived, against the backdrop of the fortress in Aleppo, where a huge Palestinian flag flutters.
By Damir Nazarov