Geopolitical Parallax And The Restoration Of Peace – Leonid Savin

This paper is not a finalized set of provisions in the field of humanities and, above all, political science and international relations, but a certain critical theory, which is built on the analysis and many years of observation of the system of international relations with its contradictions, internal conflicts and imperfections, which are inherent in any human community. It can be said that this theory, that is, a speculative judgment, is being tested and the esteemed listeners in your person can draw conclusions on this matter, express their comments and constructive proposals. Perhaps subsequent discussions will help to outline additional paths and identify those levels that should be worked out in more detail in order to finally dot the “i’s,” and the proposed theoretical model would help in practice to move along the path to a more just multipolar world order.

In our opinion, the key problem of contemporary international relations is that a certain Western model is being imposed on the world, which has not stood the test of time, as evidenced by numerous crises and conflicts. It is called the “rules-based order,” although opponents rightly claim that these rules were formulated by the West itself in its own interests. Although this model is supposed to be based on the Bretton Woods system, which began in 1944, in fact, its origins are much earlier and go back to the Enlightenment.

As a result, despite a number of theories, some of which are recognized worldwide and have an outwardly balanced approach, the West lacks a deep understanding of the strategic thinking of the Global South and the Global East. This concerns the main theoretical directions on which direct practitioners base their work – be they political advisers or decision-makers themselves. This is liberalism and realism in international relations, but also constructivism and Marxism, not to mention the emergence of extravagant postmodern theories. We are talking about theories of international relations now, although this is also true of theories of law, public administration, politics and economics – they are largely a product of Western civilization, which, if it allowed ideas from other civilizations and cultures, as a rule, subjected them to vulgar interpretation and simplification.

It is also important to note the current inclusion of religious components in international politics, which indicates the failure of the Westphalian system based on the separation of the principles of religion and politics – another achievement of Western civilization implemented in the global agenda. In recent years, the rise of political Islam in the region from North Africa to South Asia has become more than obvious. At the same time, “the Muslim view of reality, which is a metaphysical contemplation of the visible and invisible world, including a view of life in general, has nothing in common with a worldview that consists of a set of artificially collected objects, values ​​and phenomena1,” which can be attributed to secular politics. Ideally, religion and politics should be in a single continuum and represent a whole. Since this does not happen, in the current situation, obvious connections are formed between secular politics and religion, and this is a dangerous phenomenon. As Jean-Claude Milner argued, there are obviously connections between rebellion and thought, and there are obviously thoughts that have material effects2.

The mention of political Islam was made to emphasize the most significant conflicts of recent years associated with it – in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. But the same can be said about other religious traditions and cultures, with all their diversity. At the same time, when considering cultures (political, ethical, religious), different from one’s own or similar in a number of ways, the ethnocentrum effect (division into one’s own and others) necessarily arises, and the object under consideration can change depending on the adopted position of the observer.

Before considering these nuances in more detail in the modern geopolitical context, let us ask ourselves the question – what is one of the key drivers of human societies and political associations? There are different points of view on this question. However, no one will deny that fear is one of the primary emotions that plays an important role in determining how individuals, groups, tribes and states influence the choices and actions of human organizations3.

And fear is closely connected and intertwined with culture, identity, symbolic politics, rationality and emotions, which form the core of human motivation. Famous philosophers who have reflected on politics, one way or another, often talk about fear. And in the 20th century, the domestic and foreign policies of many countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, were based on fear.

According to Hobbes, in the state of nature life is conditioned by the fear of violent death, and to avoid this, a Leviathan state is needed, which makes life safer, but still filled with fear. Instead of fearing sudden death in a situation of bellum omnium contra omnes – a war of all against all – man now fears the state, which will punish him for disobedience, and this fear of the power of the state becomes a means of overcoming the fear of sudden and violent death. In essence, man exchanges fear and uncertainty for fear and confidence.

It is obvious that over the past centuries, which were at times filled with the optimism of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant’s thesis of perpetual peace, Francis Fukuyama’s failed hypothesis about the end of history during the beginning of the unipolar hegemony of the United States, and even the pathos of anti-globalization movements around the world during this period, fear remains the engine of world politics. Moreover, the technologies that representatives of various ideological movements counted on as fear suppressors have become a kind of fear multipliers. To the various phobias characteristic of the 20th century, such as unemployment, man-made disasters and the threat of war, there are now fears of terrorism, corporate power, the uprising of machines using artificial intelligence, cyberattacks, biological warfare and artificial epidemics (as demonstrated by the coronavirus epidemic in 2020), social media manipulation and social engineering, global warming, water and food shortages. Some of them have a very real basis.

The vision for solving these problems differs across a range of settings, from political affiliation to geopolitical habitat and civilizational identity. The perception of the world as a common heritage and a single family where we can jointly solve current problems and promptly respond to current challenges and possible future threats is now perceived as a utopia. Although the main division is between the collective West, which is trying to defend its own “rules-based order”, and the Global South and Global East, where a group of countries is trying to form a more just global world order based on the principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and multipolarity, the problem is deeper and more widespread.

For example, take the term “Thucydides’ trap”, which is widely used by American writers to describe the growing contradictions between the United States and China4. The underlying assumption is that fear of the growing power of Athens and the spread of its influence and regional hegemony inspired Sparta with the inevitability of war, which soon followed and ended in Athens’ defeat. Graham Allison interpreted this in a modern context as the possibility of a future war between China as an emerging power on the rise and the United States, which is the dominant power and hegemon.

However, Thucydides, as probably the first known author who mentioned fear as one of the drivers of political life in ancient cities, described the causes of the Peloponnesian War between Greek cities belonging to the same culture, where there were common values ​​and traditions, including philosophical and metaphysical attitudes and religious views. While the United States and China represent completely different peoples and traditions, including war and political decision-making. For example, take the issue of human rights, which are extremely important for Western discourse. At a meeting in Moscow a few years ago, a Chinese professor quite succinctly explained why China has a different view on this topic. He said that the concept of human rights arose on the basis of the Enlightenment thesis that God created all people equal. But in China there is no concept of God as such, so from the point of view of Chinese tradition, people cannot be equal among themselves. And they do not recognize the Western doctrine of human rights. At the same time, China has never declared its own racial superiority, but, on the contrary, there have been cases in history when the Chinese were under severe oppression and humiliation by Western civilization. And, of course, there are a number of other serious differences in worldviews that are associated with deep historical traditions.

Similarly, we can talk about other countries and regions onto which the West projects its own vision, including the solution of local problems. Hence the quite expected failure of the negotiation process on Palestine, which was supervised for many years by the US and the UN, and the problem of divided Kashmir, which has not been resolved for decades, and the inevitability of the failure of American troops in Afghanistan, and future victims in Syria and, of course, the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, which was provoked by Western arrogance.

In addition to fear, resentment plays a major role in Western politics. We can recall the historical rivalry of European powers (including the struggle for colonies in Asia, Africa and the New World), the Napoleonic Wars, Hitler’s rise to power in Germany and his desire to take revenge for the results of the Versailles Treaty, which led to World War II. In the United States, resentment was present from the very beginning – from the Boston Tea Party, which led to the declaration of independence from the British crown, to jealousy of the Soviet Revolution due to the real democratic changes that began to be implemented under the Bolsheviks. As the American historian Gordon S. Wood pointed out, “The Cold War actually began in 1917. The USSR threatened to do nothing less than displace the United States from its position as the vanguard of history. Now the Russians, not the Americans, claimed to point the way to the future.”5

And, of course, Washington’s resentment toward Cuba is more than obvious, and in Donald Trump’s rhetoric about Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, and the Gulf of Mexico, we see nothing less than a manifestation of the deep impulses of the power-psychological contours of the United States with its doctrine of predetermined destiny and the idea of ​​global superiority.

Although resentment is directly related to delayed revenge, as the French philosopher René Girard noted, it itself occurs due to misrecognition6. For this reason, resentment arises wherever different cultures meet, especially those claiming historical uniqueness.

Resentment is a companion of fear, which is included in the system of international relations and its main theories. In liberalism and neoliberalism there is a fear of war and a fear of anarchy or chaos in international relations. In realism – a fear of a change in the balance of power, that is, that another power will become stronger and it will be necessary to submit to it to one degree or another. But we also see an element of fear in Marxism, although now it comes from the bourgeoisie, which is afraid of the proletariat. This concept was described by Adam Smith, but Karl Marx made it a kind of imperative.

As a response to this potential challenge to their well-being and the status quo, theorists of bourgeois capitalism in the West developed the theory of a middle class that does not have the means of production, depends on the owners of the means of production, but its living conditions are comfortable enough, so it will not seek rebellion and revolution. Then comes the theory of economic development and the concept of dependence, which is projected onto the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. At the same time, the US proclaims the concept of the first, second and third worlds as industrially developed countries, partially developed countries and developing countries. Which in fact is nothing more than open discrimination on a global geopolitical scale! And the problem is that even critics of the capitalist system and neoliberalism, who belong to the Global East and the Global South, continue to use these terms. Instead of developing adequate theoretical models and implementing them in practice. This is evidence of intellectual and scientific colonization by the aforementioned self-proclaimed first world in the person of the collective West.

Now we return to the problem of non-recognition, non-understanding and non-acceptance, characteristic of Western political thinking, and through its dissemination having an effect on the entire world system.

To explain this Western position, which claims universality through its institutions and the so-called “rule-based order”, and with a reference to the already mentioned antiquity, I propose to use the Greek term parallax (παράλλαξις – deviation), which is used in astronomy. In simple terms, this is a change in the apparent position of an object relative to a distant background depending on the position of the observer. In other words, one and the same object can be looked at in different ways and seen differently. A similar approach is used in political frame theory, when the same object or phenomenon can be presented and shown differently, depending on the focus, primary data and the task at hand. In the media industry, a similar effect, with appropriate direction, can be used to manipulate public opinion.

And this effect in international relations is proposed to be called geopolitical parallax. Since the current era is characterized by the transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar7 one, this transformation provides additional etymological justification (the Greek word παράλλαύις comes from παραλλαγή, which means “change, alternation”). Geopolitical parallax, in this case, is the observation of another actor in international relations through the prism of one’s own strategic culture, as well as indicators of economics, politics, demography and military power. Graham Allison assessed the rise of China from precisely this position, relying on the theory of the balance of power and the theory of realism in international relations. Therefore, its phobias tend to be transmitted to others who similarly assess the growth of their neighbors’ power or, conversely, reflect on their decline. This is not the Thucydides trap, it is the optical effect of geopolitical parallax, which Allison and similar scholars ignore.

However, if we approach the analysis of the international situation objectively and responsibly and try to adequately understand the motivation and actions of other actors, we must take into account the geopolitical parallax in order to make the necessary adjustments and correctly assess both our own and others’ positions and existing potential.

The etymology of the term parallax forces us to make another remark. This is the temporal context or what is commonly called the term chronopolitics. Since the policy of any state is in constant motion, the factor of correct perception of the actions of another actor is also important here. Just as the position of an object changes in relation to the general background and the place of the observer, different speed modes in states and political associations indicate that the assessment scale and standards must be constantly adjusted. Databases with existing models of analysis and methodologies quickly become outdated, while we can only rely on forecasting trends, and not on the actual course of action of numerous actors in international relations. And existing international treaties and the presence of the UN institution do not provide any guarantees, which was objectively demonstrated by the crisis in Palestine.

Another aspect related to time is its perception itself. According to Aristotle, there is a certain goal-setting, teleology, which leads us along a certain path. Do we perceive goals and this path correctly? What is the appropriate criterion in this regard? Where is the place for the past, future and present? And how to perceive all this as a whole? Sometimes excessive optimism about the future is noticeable, often retrograde motives about the “golden age” can be encountered. It seems that only a holistic approach, including the past, present and future, will give a more correct understanding of the goal. In other words, a political strategy, although it can have short-term, medium-term and long-term plans, must proceed from its own positioning in relation to eternity. And not in an abstract sense, but through the coordination of care for future generations.

If we have an understanding of the geopolitical parallax effect, the next step is how to overcome fear and resentment in international relations? Obviously, this is necessary, since any peace held together by these two emotions will be short-lived and fragile.

To achieve unity of worldview and political empathy, we must think about how we look at each other, how we see and evaluate the behavior of others, but similar to ourselves. American anthropologist William Sumner introduced the term “ethnocentrism”, implying that all societies are divided into “we-group” and “they-group” – and this thesis is often used in the analysis of modern conflicts. Probably, the fact that such an idea could be born in the United States was not accidental, and Jose Marti often made similar conclusions from his observations while inside this country.

A radically opposite point of view is the position of the Russian ethnographer and traveler Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay, who in polemics with European scientists argued that there are no worse and better nations. Miklouho-Maclay was the discoverer of New Guinea and introduced the method of “participant observation”, that is, the need to live among the peoples who are the object of research. Thus, the researcher becomes part of society, the subject enters the object.

At the same time, it is necessary to remember the law of darkness, which says that it is impossible to 100% understand the object being studied.

At the same time, it is not only about the diversity of peoples, but also of political systems, which makes the task more difficult. Moreover, some political systems are agents of neoliberal hegemony, which claims to be global, and tries to achieve this in two ways. One way is suppression and control, including military interventions, as we see in the example of the US invasion of Iraq. The second way is to achieve agreement, as Antonio Gramsci spoke about, and this agreement can be achieved indirectly through cultural, identification, ideological and other instruments, ultimately leading to a universal formula for the distribution of capital and dependence on the supranational institutions of the Bretton Woods project.

If we follow the dichotomy of the unipolar hegemony of the USA and its satellites on the one hand, and the multipolarity of countries advocating for sovereign development on the other, we come to the following scheme. If the neoliberal order in its actions follows the pair suppression-agreement, then in the multipolar camp the pair agreement-disagreement works. On the one hand, such a statement seems paradoxical. However, according to Hegel’s dialectic, we are apparently now in the final phase of the unity and struggle of opposites, where they (types of struggle) are now most manifested in the most diverse spheres and regions. Therefore, such a paradox should not be surprising.

If, in general, there is a fairly clear understanding of the reasons for criticism of neoliberal unipolarity, including Western theories, let us consider in more detail the pair of agreement and disagreement on the multipolar model. Here, agreement is somewhat different from the historical pact mentioned by Gramsci, as well as the neoliberal method, and lies in the importance of protecting one’s own sovereignty and recognizing the rights of other countries to their own unique path of development and political governance, which are based on the cultural traditions of this people or peoples. Disagreement is the other side of this agreement, when we do not recognize the neoliberal model as a guiding star, and when there is a consensus on mutual respect for interests and values, without necessarily sharing them completely. For example, as a Russian person professing Eastern Orthodox Christianity, I cannot follow the dogmas of the Vatican, which are adhered to by people of the Catholic faith living in Cuba and Latin American countries. However, we can interact in the political, cultural, scientific and technical spheres for the common good. We may not agree with traditional community decision-making practices such as the palawer in Africa or the jirga among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan when these methods are proposed to us. But we agree that they have a right to exist in their historical environment and that their transformation or adaptation should occur organically, in accordance with the needs of societies and the challenges of the era.

Multipolar disagreement is a kind of positive freedom that gives, on the one hand, the potential for creative expression, but also enormous responsibility, including a framework for action. And responsibility must be backed up by knowledge. Therefore, the solution to the current misunderstandings and conflicts is seen in a radical change in the education system and the adoption of a new international legal model, along with an active role for non-Western international organizations and associations, such as BRICS.

As a practical solution, I would like to give a specific example that is being implemented in Russia. The Higher Political School, which is engaged in the reorganization of the humanities complex, operates on the basis of the Russian State Humanitarian University. This educational and scientific center was created on the initiative of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and has been operating at the federal level for the second year.

The activities of the Higher Political School are aimed at the full and comprehensive implementation in the system of higher education and science of the principles of state policy on the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values ​​and the conceptual justification of the civilizational identity of Russia.

The main areas of activity of this center are:

  • development and implementation of a new approach (a new socio-humanitarian paradigm) in the domestic teaching of humanitarian and social disciplines based on the Russian civilizational identity and traditional Russian spiritual and moral values;
  • professional retraining of employees of higher education institutions responsible for educational work and youth policy; In other words, the results obtained are passed on to colleagues across the country, where representatives of other universities and academies at the level of rectors and deputy rectors undergo retraining and advanced training.
  • scientific and methodological support for activities to form a harmoniously developed, patriotic and socially responsible personality based on traditional Russian spiritual, moral and cultural-historical values.

At the same time, when preparing proposals for the introduction of new educational and scientific programs and methodologies, those gaps that existed due to the dominance of the Western-centric point of view in the sciences are filled. In other words, the resulting vacuum that arises from the revision and rejection of the neoliberal paradigm is filled more efficiently and comprehensively, the philosophical thought and original experience of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America are studied. Therefore, the focus is not only on traditional Russian values, but also on a deeper understanding of the world. And I am convinced that this will help overcome the distortions caused by the geopolitical parallax.

The experience of the Higher Political School can be useful in other countries and scaled up at the international level.

Of course, for a more complete picture, an analysis of similar examples in other BRICS countries and partners of this association is needed. And then – a certain synthesis of the best practices that could be applied on a global scale. Humanitarian and intellectual cooperation should have a deeper character than formal agreements and exchange of opinions. The sanctions of the West against the countries of the multipolar club – Cuba, Venezuela, Russia, Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and partly China – show that unipolar hegemony is interested not only in economic suppression, but also in excluding alternative opinions and theories, so that all humanitarian processes are channeled through the instruments of the collective West, pass through certain frameworks there and are tamed by the capitalist neoliberal system.

This is one of the reasons why we need to intensify our joint efforts. And this platform in Havana, like others around the world, is extremely important for advancing this agenda. As Fidel Castro said: “We will continue to gather together, we will continue to fight, we will continue to proclaim our truths to the world.”8

In conclusion, I would like to note that we understand the concerns of the government and people of Cuba regarding the actions of the United States – both throughout the history of the struggle for independence and after the victory of the Cuban Revolution, and in light of recent events. In the prism of geopolitical parallax, this country is a huge giant that hangs over Cuba and tries to overshadow other actors in international relations. However, do not forget that in another part of the world there is an equally giant country – your friend and partner, and together we can do much to restore peace. As Fidel Castro said in this same building at the closing of the World Conference on Dialogue of Civilizations on March 20, 2005, regarding Russia – “we must all unite, conduct a dialogue of defenders of civilization.”9

Reference:

1. Seyd Muhammad NAquib al-Attas. Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam. Kuala Lumour: ISTAC, 1995.
2. Jean-Claude Milner. Constats. Paris: Verdier, 1999.
3. Muqtedar Khan and Isa Haskologlu. Fear as Driver of International Relations, E-IR, Sep 2 2020. https://www.e-ir.info/2020/09/02/fear-as-driver-of-international-relations/
4. Graham Allison. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.
5. Gordon S. Wood. The Idea of Anerica. Reflections on the Birth of the United States. NY: The Penguin Press, 2011. Р. 406.
6. Rene Girard. Achever Clausewitz. Entretiens avec Benoit Chantre. Carnets Nord, 2007. P. 125.
7. Leonid Savin. Ordo Pluriversalis: The End Of Pax Americana And The Rise Of Multipolarity. London: Black House Publishing, 2020.
8. Fidel ante los Problemas del Mundo Contemporaneo. Discursos de Fidel Castro Ruz: 1959-2016. Centro Fidel Castro Ruz/Manu Pineda. La Habana: Atrapasuenos, 2023. P. 429.
9. Fidel ante los Problemas del Mundo Contemporaneo. Discursos de Fidel Castro Ruz: 1959-2016. Centro Fidel Castro Ruz/Manu Pineda. La Habana: Atrapasuenos, 2023. p. 699.

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