7 years ago, the DPRK joined the “nuclear club,” and since then, it has been demonized as a threat to the world which seeks to start a nuclear war.
A steady course towards the development of nuclear capabilities
On September 9, speaking at a meeting in Pyongyang to mark the 76th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un noted that “the DPRK will steadily strengthen its nuclear forces so that it is capable of fully countering any threatening actions by its nuclear rivals. It will redouble its measures and efforts to make all the armed forces of the state including the nuclear force fully ready for combat. We are now implementing the policy of building nuclear Armed Forces without the slightest concession, and the nuclear combat Armed Forces of the Republic are operating under an ironclad command and control system as one of the key elements of its deterrence strategy and a response to possible ‘decapitation strikes’.”
On September 13, the KCNA reported that Kim Jong-un “inspected the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the production base of weapon-grade nuclear materials [and] acquainted himself with the production of nuclear warheads and current nuclear materials…”
The DPRK leader familiarized himself with the operation of the production lines, expressed satisfaction with the process, and stressed the need “to further augment the number of centrifuges and to exponentially increase the nuclear weapons for self-defense… not [to be] content with the successes and, at the same time, to further raise the individual separation ability of the centrifuge and push forward the introduction of a new-type centrifuge which has already reached its completion stage as planned.” He also reiterated his view that “the peculiarity of the Korean revolution to constantly confront with the US and contain it and prospective threats require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its defense capability for self-defense and the capability for a preemptive attack with the nuclear force as a pivot.”
Photos and expert assessments
But more important than the speech itself were the accompanying photos. Pyongyang has for the first time publicly presented its uranium enrichment facilities to the world, including photos of what appear to be several cascades of centrifuges that are believed to be modified versions of centrifuges previously built with the help of Abdul Qadeer Khan, considered the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
In 2010, North Korea invited the renowned American nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker and showed him the Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant. Since then, predictions about the DPRK’s nuclear capacity have been based on his impressions—and here is an update.
“The centrifuges revealed by North Korea appear to be slightly shorter than a person, suggesting that North Korea may have modified its existing centrifuges,” said Lee Sang-kyu, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Experts from 38north also point out that “the centrifuges shown are not the P-2 equivalents observed by Dr. Siegfried Hecker during his delegation’s visit to the main Uranium Enrichment Plant (UEP) facility in Yongbyon in 2010, but a more advanced design.”
The Dong-A Ilbo newspaper has also published estimates of the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities from the aforementioned Lee Sang-kyu and other “officially confirmed data from South Korean intelligence agencies”:
– the amount of highly enriched uranium produced by North Korea to date is estimated at 2,044 kilograms, and that of plutonium at 68-72 kilograms;
– given the DPRK’s level of technology, it needs about 25 kg of HEU and 4 to 8 kg of plutonium to make one warhead; thus, Pyongyang currently has about 90 nuclear warheads—80 with uranium and 8 to 17 with plutonium;
– by 2030, North Korea is expected to have produced up to 3,408 kilograms of HEU and 107-123 kilograms of plutonium, which would increase its nuclear arsenal to 162-166;
– the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead can be installed on most of North Korea’s new missiles;
– its carriers include: KN-23 (Hwasong-11A, aka Kimskander), KN-24 (Hwasongpho-11B, also known as North Korea’s ATACMS), the KN-25 super-heavy 600-mm MLRS, the Hwasal-1 and Hwasal-2 cruise missiles, the Haeil-type underwater unmanned strike drone, a mini SLBM, and a short-range tactical guided missile (CRBM, Hwasong-11D);
– the warhead, it is hypothesized, may contain an “American-style” nuclear explosive device in the shape of an “oval sphere,” which allows for increased explosive force due to its greater density.
More talk of a nuclear test.
Cheong Seong-chang, a director at the Sejong Institute and supporter of South Korea’s nuclear armament, said that “ahead of the US election, North Korea is sending a message to the US—don’t expect denuclearization of North Korea, as it is an impossible goal.”
Hong Min, a senior fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, also believes that with its rare disclosure of the nuclear facility, North Korea appears to be sending a message to both Democratic and Republican presidential candidates.
However, many Western and ROK analysts have gone further, fearing that Kim’s visit to the nuclear facility could be a precursor to Pyongyang’s seventh nuclear test.
“We are trying to figure out the North’s intentions behind the disclosure while monitoring and analyzing the overall situation in North Korea,” a senior official in South Korea’s presidential administration said. The timing of a nuclear test, he said, could vary depending on the North Korean leadership’s decision, but Pyongyang will clearly consider various factors, including the US presidential election.
South Korea’s intelligence agency has also said there are indications that North Korea is trying to significantly improve its technology to miniaturize nuclear weapons in nuclear tests.
To summarize
In 2023, the country enshrined in its constitution a policy of strengthening its nuclear forces, and it has repeatedly declared that its status as a nuclear state is irreversible. The latest developments emphasize this.
As Russian military expert Vladimir Khrustalyov notes, the “endless repetition of ridiculous assessments of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal are being replaced by more realistic ones… For too long, it has been standard practice to laugh arrogantly or to play the game of ‘let’s imagine that, in terms of nuclear technology, the DPRK is stuck in 1945-1946’.” According to him, the time is not far off when the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal could reach 200 or 300 nuclear (and thermonuclear) warheads.
It is time get used to living in a new reality.
Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, part of the China and Modern Asia Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”