Since the 18th CCP Congress (autumn 2012), the concept of modern Chinese diplomacy has undergone significant changes, shifting its course towards the construction of a new ‘diplomacy of the original Chinese great power’ (tese dago waijiao 特色大国外交). It should be said at once that diplomacy is the most conservative sphere of intellectual activity in China in general and the CCP in particular. It has received a minimum of theoretical innovation throughout Chinese history, and it is in this regard that it is very important to know and understand its historical roots, context, vocabulary and ideological foundations. I will discuss these foundations in more detail in the second part of the article.

At the 19th Congress (2017), the following new qualities of Chinese diplomacy were announced: ‘omnidirectionality/inclusiveness’ (quanmianwei 全方位), ‘multilevel’ (dotseng 多层次) and ‘voluminosity’ (lithihua 立体化). Under Xi Jinping, the course was set on conceptual contributions to the theory and practice of international relations, forming its own discussion platforms and launching its own strategic initiatives. Moreover, this multi-sectoral and multi-level nature is evident in the nature of China’s now focused foreign policy network formation: the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has developed strategies for every region of the world and presented them in the form of policy documents. In particular, two strategies for Africa were adopted in 2006 and 2015. On 5 November 2008, the first document was developed for Latin American and Caribbean states (the second programme was published on 24 November 2016), on 2 April 2014 for European countries (an updated version appeared in December 2018) and on 13 January 2016 for Arab states. In January 2018, the first edition of the White Paper “China’s Arctic Policy” was published. [1].

At the 18th CCP Congress itself, Xi Jinping expressed the key element of the modern Chinese leadership’s foreign policy doctrine: the concept of the ‘Community of Humanity’s Common Destiny’, which is a continuation of the concept of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (1949). Today, all initiatives and activities of Chinese diplomacy are linked to this slogan. It has acquired normative status at both party and state levels, being enshrined in both the CCP Charter and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.

As a result, Chinese authors and ideologues are developing a new terminology apparatus suited to the modern paradigm: ‘community of destiny’, ‘the concept of correct understanding of duty and benefit’. Taking into account the multi-sectoral nature of foreign policy, special ‘key concepts’ of relations for individual regions are also being developed. Thus, for the African continent, a path of four hieroglyphics has appeared: ‘truthfulness’, ‘practicality’, ‘closeness’ (‘kinship’) and ‘sincerity’. Note that all these concepts are the essence of ancient Confucian categories taken from philosophical treatises and canonical texts.

In addition, the concept of the ‘Chinese Dream of the Great Rebirth of the Chinese Nation’ (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de zhongguomen 中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦), or ‘Chinese Dream’ for short (Zhongguo meng 中国梦), was also proposed by Xi Jinping during the 18th CCP Congress in 2012. It is often translated and abbreviated simply as ‘The Chinese Dream’, which helps to increase its popularity and attract partners, but I would like to draw your attention to the main part, the second part, ‘the great renaissance of the Chinese nation’. This is the ideology that has guided China after years of unequal treaties, military failures, shocks and a complex stagnation in development. This concept has become the foundation on which the conceptual foundations of modern Chinese foreign policy have been built: to enter the world arena as the initiator of strong projects, to increase its peaceful influence in the regions. It is also ideologically underpinned by the diplomatic concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ (Zhongguo heping jueqi 中国和平崛起), proposed in 2003 by Zheng Bijian.

In terms of his attitude towards recent events and the current state of world politics, Xi Jinping presented his vision at the annual conference of the Boao Forum on 20 April 2021. He provided a negative characterisation of the state of the international relations system, noting the growth of instability and uncertainty, as well as the deficit in governance, trust, development and peace. The negative trends mentioned lead to the fact that in recent years there have been no fundamental changes in the movement towards the formation of a multipolar world [2]. It should also be noted that this assessment once again bears the imprint of traditional notions of ‘ideal relations’, in this regard it is necessary to briefly consider their origins.

The traditional foundations of Chinese diplomacy, ideology and foreign policy

The revolutionary years and then the CCP’s victory and establishment of power after 1949 entailed a revision and re-organisation of the state institutions and rhetoric of both the Qing Empire and the Kuomintang period. However, the space of diplomatic practices was transmitted through these changes in a peculiar way: despite the change of regime and political course, China still had to remain and position itself as the successor of ancestral wisdom and as the promoter of policies aimed at ensuring that the Chinese state occupied its rightful place in the world community. In this regard, Chinese diplomacy, as mentioned at the beginning of the article, has been more reluctant than other spheres to allow changes in its content and structure, continuing to draw its evidence base and key ideologues from ancient Chinese diplomatic practices and the treatises of ancient Chinese philosophers. Let us formulate the main features of this school.

The foundations of foreign policy doctrine and diplomatic culture were formed under the influence of the following factors:

• the cult of ancestors;
• respect for elders, the principle of filial veneration (xiao 孝);
• self-cultivation practices (xushen 修身) and the stimulus-response concept (ganyin 感應, – emphasis on the personality of the ruler and the consequences of his activities);
• the cult of loyalty to the ruler (zhong 忠) and his sacred status as the Son of Heaven (tianqi 天子);
• the concept of the civilising and world-building function of the Celestial Empire (tianxia 天下);
• the concept of the ‘command of Heaven’ (tianming 天命), which legitimises the political power of the ruler;
• the ‘China-barbarians’ centre-periphery ideology.

The position as the civil, political and cultural centre of East Asia formed a cultural superiority complex in China, which included a high mission of the ruler of China – the Son of Heaven – to spread his power to neighbouring peoples [3]. Hence the tribute system of ‘nominal vassalage’, according to which in order to receive military aid, security guarantees and favourable trade from the Chinese ruler for small neighbouring states, it was sufficient to recognise his sovereignty and bring a symbolic tribute.

This determined the prioritisation of the key directions and ideologies of modern Chinese diplomacy (repeatedly conveyed in the official speeches of CCP leaders) [4]:

• focus on compromise
• perception of strong power as the highest valu
• centralisation and territorial integrity as an asset
• priority of political methods over military ones
• rationalism, pragmatism, practicality and caution in actions;
• careful observance of hierarchy, conventions and rituals;
• Chinese pride in China’s ancient history and great culture;
• an appeal to historical memory;
• a sense of national dignity.

Contemporary Russian-Chinese Diplomacy

The above is intended to emphasise that the further maintenance of the Russia-China dialogue requires the Russian side to study and understand in detail the traditional Chinese ideological vocabulary and the modern party-political vocabulary, and to closely monitor the changes taking place in it.
The Russian Federation and the PRC have concluded many treaties and issued many joint declarations, including those on international relations entering a new era and on global sustainable development (2022).

The key provisions of these agreements can be seen as the following:

“Unmodelled Democracy”, which implies that, depending on the socio-political structure, history, traditions and cultural characteristics of a particular state, its people have the right to choose the forms and methods of democracy implementation that are appropriate to the specificities of that state. Only the people have the right to judge whether a state is democratic. This provision aims to counter the monopolisation of the understanding of democracy by individual states and to promote genuine democracy.

The new phase of global development should be characterised by balance, harmony and inclusiveness.

Emphasis on ensuring and maintaining security.

A path to multipolarity

Other documents may be more specific, but in their essence they boil down to these themes and provisions. I would like to draw attention to the language of these documents: statements by the leaders of the two countries often refer to the adoption of the Chinese approach to various concepts, for example the concept of ‘development’. In the Chinese public consciousness, development is mainly seen as a technology-oriented modernisation process. Accordingly, the 2019 Russia-China joint document emphasised the priority of cooperation in science, technology and innovation. Other areas, although recognised as important, are still in the background. For the Chinese side, this is quite logical, as a set of relevant meanings is formed around the image of the ‘Chinese Dream’: technology, innovation, technical development, prosperity. The image of the ‘American Dream’ is also well structured and communicates relevant meanings of freedom, opportunity, novelty, self-fulfilment. But what is the ‘Russian Dream’? Are its meanings formed in a coherent structure and can they be transmitted on the external circuit as successfully as the meanings of, for example, the ‘Chinese Dream’?

One cannot speak of a broad influence of Russian ideology or Russian diplomatic ideologems on the Chinese, because the Chinese side is able to Chineseise any effective concept and ideologem and incorporate it into its own agenda, and then export it to the outside world as part of its own Chinese thinking (in particular, this is the case with the idea of multipolarity, which, with formal Chinese support, is replaced in the actual Chinese political discourse by the concept of ‘the community of humanity’s common destiny’). It seems that in relation to China, the Russian specificities of rhetoric, ideological message and targeting have not yet been sufficiently developed. This is related to the problem of positioning the Russian ideological agenda in the course of the Russian-Chinese dialogue: the Russian side has very few effective tools in China to work with in this area (it should be noted that the Chinese side is actively creating cultural and language centres that confidently introduce and promote Chinese culture in Russia and the world at mass level).

It should be noted that historically such a centre existed: since the 17th century, the Russian Spiritual Mission operated in Beijing, which played an important role in establishing and maintaining Russian-Chinese relations. The mission was the centre for the scientific study of China and the training of the first Russian sinologists, and the representatives of the mission were entrusted not only with missionary and spiritual tasks, but also with political and diplomatic ones. Initially, the mission was not subordinate to the Governing Synod, as one might assume, but to the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mission continued to exist after the Xinhai Revolution in China in 1911 and after the Russian Revolution of 1917, only in 1955 its activity was finally discontinued. In the modern Chinese Orthodox Church, there has not been a primate for a long time, and no one is actually involved in maintaining the temples and their activities. As archpriest Dionisy (Pozdnyaev) notes: ‘In the last 30 years, the number of Christians in the PRC, according to the most conservative estimates, has grown many times (Catholics – 4 times since 1949, Protestants – 20 times in the same period). <The Orthodox Church remains the only Christian Church whose number of parishioners and churches in China has not only not increased, but even decreased.” [5]. That is, despite the growth of followers of other Christian denominations, only the number of Orthodox Christians (and with it indirectly the familiarity with Russian culture) in China is decreasing.

Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church officially cannot directly influence the recreation of the Orthodox environment in mainland China, and legal restrictions do not allow the recreation of the Orthodox environment in the PRC to distribute spiritual and educational literature. This issue should gradually become more visible, having cultural and educational as well as diplomatic and political dimensions. Without spiritual and educational centres that spread Russian culture and introduce Russian ideas and spiritual life, it is difficult to imagine a productive dialogue between civilisations. Unless concrete steps are taken towards solving this problem (in particular, the re-establishment of the Autonomous Orthodox Church in China), the memory of the common Soviet historical past will gradually fade in the minds of the older generations of Chinese, while the younger generations have already been conquered by the Western agenda and ideology for all intents and purposes (including, as we see, the soft diffusion of Catholicism and Protestantism). While the concept of the ‘Chinese Dream’ seems to be intuitive for the Russians, the ‘Russian Dream’ and the idea of Russia require comprehensive elaboration and targeted dissemination in China.

Notes:

[1] – Mokretsky A. Ch. On China’s ‘new opportunities’ diplomacy // East Asia: past, present, future. 2020. №7. С. 17.
[2] – Nezhdanov V. L., Tsvetov P. Yu. Xi Jinping’s ideas on Russian-Chinese diplomacy and strategic partnership // Observer – Observer. 2021. №7 (378). С. 53-54.
[3] – For more details on the concept of imperial power in traditional China, see Martynov A.S. Status of Tibet in the 17th-18th centuries in the traditional Chinese system of political representations. Moscow: Nauka, 1978.
[4] – Barskiy K.M. K kumu k o formirovanie sovremennoi chinese diplomatic school // Russian Chinese Studies, 1 (2023). С. 100-116.
[5] – Pozdnyaev D. Chinese Orthodoxy: Russian perspective // State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad. 2011. №3-4. С. 164.

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