1. In light of recent events, in which China, India, Iran and Pakistan are becoming more important to Russia, how does it affect Russia’s relation with other countries that it also has close relations with? Specifically, do you think there will be a major change in its partnerships with countries like Vietnam, North Korea, Myanmar, Syria, Venezuela?

Those countries that didn’t vote against Russia at the United Nations will be regarded as Moscow’s privileged partners in this new phase of the New Cold War between it and the West. Myanmar is the exception since it voted to condemn Russia at the General Assembly but most likely did so under foreign duress and as part of a ploy expected (whether naively or not) to alleviate some of the major pressure that it’s been under over the past year. Those two countries still retain very close military ties, which aren’t predicted to change in spite of Naypyidaw’s politically symbolic but ultimately non-binding vote.

Russia is compelled to accelerate its grand strategic reorientation towards non-Western countries that began in earnest following the West’s initial imposition of sanctions against it in 2014 after what Moscow regards as its democratic reunification with Crimea but which few states recognize. It must also preemptively ensure that it doesn’t become disproportionately dependent on any given partner such as China. That’s why the Eurasian Great Power will actively multi-align between a variety of non-Western countries, with India likely playing the most important strategic counterbalancing role in this respect.

Iran and Pakistan serve different purposes for Russian grand strategy: the first-mentioned is an important energy-producing country whose potential has hitherto remained untapped due to unilateral US-led Western sanctions while the second is a pivotal partner for containing Afghan-emanating security threats such as those posed by terrorism and large-scale refugee flows caused by its unresolved humanitarian crisis. Venezuela can be regarded as similarly strategic to Iran due to its massive energy reserves too that have also largely been taken off the market due to US sanctions.

Comparatively smaller states like Vietnam, North Korea, Myanmar, and Syria are also important to Russia too. Vietnam serves as its anchor in ASEAN and is a decades-long and deeply trusted comprehensive strategic partner. It’ll help Russia retain some role in this geo-economically dynamic region at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific where many global processes are increasingly converging. North Korea, meanwhile, provides Russia with an opportunity to remain diplomatically relevant to Japan and South Korea considering the unresolved nuclear issue.

As for Myanmar, it’s become very isolated after last year’s dramatic political events, but that in turn prompted it to turn towards Russia as a friendly, gentle, and non-hostile counterbalance for preemptively ensuring that it doesn’t become disproportionately dependent on China in those conditions. In a sense, Russia serves the same role for Myanmar vis-à-vis China as India does for Russia vis-à-vis China. Concerning Syria, it’s Russia’s strategic foothold in West Asia upon which Moscow has actively inserted itself as an irreplaceable balancing force following the US’ gradual decline in influence.

It also deserves mentioning that Ethiopia is expected to play a major role in Russia’s strategy across Africa since it’s one of that country’s oldest allies. Ties remained strong all throughout their history and are poised to further expand in the coming future under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visionary leadership. This Horn of Africa leader, which is also Africa’s second most populous country with enormous economic potential, should be included on the list of Russia’s top non-Western partners whenever discussing its comprehensive strategic engagement with the Global South.

2. Will those countries, especially Vietnam, play a role in Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) in a similar manner such as China taking a financial-technical role while India plays the strategic part?

The emerging grand strategic role of each of Russia’s top non-Western partners is still being determined but it’s expected that they’ll all come to play a complementary one in their own way. Vietnam will remain Russia’s ASEAN anchor and is predicted to retain excellent relations with its historical strategic partner. This is a crucial role that can’t be played by any other regional country like Myanmar, which is largely isolated from the rest of ASEAN and the world more broadly.

The reaffirmed strategic partnership pact agreed to between the Vietnamese and Russian leaders during the former’s visit to Moscow in early December will form the basis for their relations across the rest of the decade. The next year or two might not see the most progress though due to the US-led West’s attempts to isolate the Eurasian Great Power and the short-term impact that this will have on its economic and financial capabilities.

That said, there’s no doubt that everything will eventually bounce back with time, especially since both sides have the political will to implement their goals. Vietnam relies on Moscow’s military wares to ensure its regional national security interests while Russia greatly respects Hanoi for providing it with a regional foothold. Vietnam’s competitive capabilities are different than China’s and India’s, but Russia will certainly find a way to equally incorporate this geostrategically positioned partner into the GEP.

3. You had mentioned that the success in Central Asia with Neo-NAM is expected to spread and be expanded to part of Africa and Southeast Asia, but how long will it take to make it in the latter? Where are countries like Vietnam positioned in the Neo-NAM, and what’s their role in maintaining balance and stability?

The 99-paragraph reaffirmed strategic partnership pact agreed to by the Russian and Indian leaders during the former’s visit to New Delhi in early December includes paragraphs, particularly the 93^rd, that very strongly suggest that they intend to jointly, though informally, assemble a new Non-Aligned Movement (“Neo-NAM”) for creating a third pole of influence in the increasingly bi-multipolar world order that’s largely shaped by the competition between the American and Chinese superpowers.

Russia is opening the doors to Central Asia for India with the intent of New Delhi preemptively ensuring that the region doesn’t become disproportionately dependent on China in the coming future, though of course doing this in a friendly, gentle, and non-hostile manner that’s mutually beneficial for all parties and doesn’t occur at the expense of those two’s fellow BRICS and SCO Chinese partner. This part of Eurasia is where the Neo-NAM is first being experimented with in practice.

It’s easier to do so here because those countries are already close with Russia, they view India very positively due to the famous Soviet legacy of their relations, and their mutual Iranian partners are facilitating New Delhi’s economic access to the region through the eastern branch of the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC). There’s also very minimal American influence there that could be leveraged to divide and rule this region and its Great Power stakeholders, which helps retain stability there.

Southeast Asia is altogether different in every respect because it’s completely open in all ways, its countries (with few exceptions like Myanmar) have excellent relations with a variety of extra-regional stakeholders like the US and India for instance, and it’s very geo-economically dynamic. Truth be told, most of its members and the bloc as a whole are already balancing between Great Powers but they’re being placed under much more pressure by the US to choose sides in the New Cold War.

Some might soon become more sensitive to how their relations with America and China are perceived by the other, concerned as they may be that one might worry about their intentions in expanding certain ties with the other such as those that involve the military and technological spheres. A pragmatic means of preemptively averting these zero-sum perceptions could be to rely more on neutral third parties like India for obtaining whatever it is that they need without risking offending one or the other.

Joint Russian-Indian initiatives like the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and perhaps whatever other ventures those two come together to create could serve an important balancing role for the Southeast Asian countries. It’s enough to mention that the Philippines, a decades-long US mutual defense ally, agreed to purchase over $350 worth of BrahMos in late January. Importantly, Washington didn’t threaten to sanction it under CAATSA like it threatened to sanction India for its S-400s.

It can’t be known for sure why that is since the US hasn’t clarified the reason, but it might be because this venture is a joint Russian-Indian one and not a solely Russian venture. Should this trend of the US declining to sanction such joint ventures – including military ones – remain constant, and that of course remains to be seen in light of the new global circumstances brought about by Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, then it could serve as the basis for more promising joint engagement with ASEAN.

In general, the ASEAN countries must avoid taking sides between America and China, instead seeking out neutral third-party balancing forces like the envisioned Russian-Indian Neo-NAM in all its forms (the most visible of which is presently the BrahMos missiles but more are expected to materialize) in order to maintain their multi-alignment between those two superpowers while still preserving their strategic autonomy. Each country will go about this differently, but most are expected to pursue this policy.

4. Are any major changes to be expected in the Russia-Vietnam relationship when the special military operation in Ukraine ends?

Not necessarily since both countries have the joint political will to continue expanding their relations in line with their reaffirmed strategic partnership pact from early December, but the US might seek to actively meddle in their relations due to its desire to impose zero-sum choices upon all other countries. This could take the form of threatening to sanction Vietnam through CAATSA for its purchase of Russian defense equipment, but Vietnam might also get a waiver due to the importance of these imports.

India has yet to acquire its hoped-for waiver and might ultimately never get one since America has thus far remained very ambiguous about this, but one argument in favor of granting it such is that the South Asian state requires Russian wares in order to bolster its defensive capabilities vis-à-vis China. This same reasoning can equally be applied to Vietnam. Moreover, neither India nor Vietnam can radically transition away from Soviet and Russian wares towards Western ones. It’s simply not possible.

One promising possibility for attempting to preemptively avert America’s potential CAATSA sanctions threats is to explore purchasing more jointly produced Russian-Indian arms like the BrahMos supersonic missiles that the nearby Philippines just agreed to buy in late January and which America somewhat surprisingly declined to threaten sanctions for. Since Russia will be producing more arms in India per that country’s Make In India policy, more jointly produced wares will soon be available on the market.

These products could become viable workarounds for avoiding any American sanctions threats that the most hawkish politicians might propose. They should be seriously considered by those three countries – Vietnam, Russia, and India – especially because any form of trilateral cooperation between them is mutually beneficial, whether it’s in the military realm or whatever else. Regardless of the form if takes, though, there’s no doubt that Russian-Vietnamese relations will continue strengthening.

5. There are countries sharing a close relationship with Russia but which have conflicts with each other in many aspects, such as Vietnam and China regarding the South China Sea. In your opinion, how will Russia balance its relationships with those countries? Is it possible that Russia will prioritize its relations with “key partners” (like “the Four” mentioned above), or will they take an active role if conflicts are elevated?

Russia is unique in the sense that many of its partners are rivals of one another. Among those are Armenia-Azerbaijan, India-China, India-Pakistan, Iran & Israel-GCC States, Syria-Turkey, and Vietnam-China. It’s always been clear, though, that none of its ties with any one rival is intended to occur at the other’s expense, and this includes their military relations. It continues to sell such products to both sides with the intent of maintaining the balance of power between them, all with a view towards dissuading either party from resorting to military means for resolving disputes and instead pursuing political ones.

With this strategy in mind, Russia isn’t expected to prioritize any one of them over the other. This isn’t just an optimistic prediction but one that’s based on documented diplomatic facts. The reaffirmed Russian-Vietnamese Strategic Partnership pact from early December saw both sides referencing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) a total of three times in spite of China not recognizing its earlier ruling against it in support of the Philippines. Some thought that Russia wouldn’t ever mention UNCLOS due to China’s sensitivities but this recent document confirmed how neutral it truly is.

This means that Vietnam doesn’t have to worry about being treated as Russia’s “junior partner”, nor have its interests “sacrificed” at the speculative request of Moscow’s Chinese partners. The Kremlin already proved that it pursues an independent foreign policy that aims to balance between all the supercontinent’s countries, including rival pairs, in ways that don’t occur at any of their expense. It could easily have taken China’s side but chose not to since it didn’t want to offend Vietnam. Citing UNCLOS three times was because Russia supports its role in international law, not for any anti-Chinese reason.

That said, the sensitive optics of Russia’s balancing acts across Eurasia will surely prompt ill-intended third parties into spinning its policies in hostile ways that serve their divide-and-rule interests. In this particular context, China and Vietnam must be keenly aware of these unfriendly efforts from afar and not be tempted into believing that there’s any credibility to the false claims that Russia is supporting one over the other at any given time. Russia hopes to work equally with those countries, albeit in different manners considering their respective differences, and would never support one against the other.

The interview was first published at Cánh Cò under the title “Chuyên gia: Với Nga, Việt Nam có một vị thế không ai có thể thay thế”.