Here’s what Putin really meant by updating Russia’s nuclear doctrine, explains Vasily Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE.
This week’s proposed update of Russia’s nuclear doctrine was signaled well in advance. According to President Vladimir Putin, it was under preparation for at least several months, and probably longer. The catalyst was, of course, Ukraine’s expansion of both the list of Western weapons it uses and the geography of its military operations against Russia. Obviously, based on these experiences, the country’s leadership decided to refine its doctrinal documents and ensure they reflect all the threats that were previously considered insignificant, but which have now come to the fore.
As this is a long process, experts from different countries have been discussing the possible development of the situation for a long time. There is an understanding among our friends that Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy will evolve in the current unprecedented conditions. We should not expect any expressions of joy, but neither will there be any significant negative consequences.
The West has a well-developed model for responding to any Russian actions in the nuclear sphere. Officially, it declares that it won’t be affected in any way and that it doesn’t intend to take Russian warnings into account. But in practice we know that a statement made at the presidential level always has an impact, and often a strong one. It is worth remembering that during the Ukraine conflict quite radical options have been discussed, including the creation of a no-fly zone, the deployment of NATO troops, the stationing of fighter jets that could operate over Ukrainian soil, and much more. But none of this happened, precisely because the Russian side expressed and articulated very painful options for its military response. And these warnings worked.
Our next steps could be additional exercises or the abandonment of some previously accepted restrictions – for example on the storage of tactical nuclear weapons and their concentration in central storage bases. At some point, I suppose, nuclear tests are possible, although there have been statements that we will not conduct them before the Americans do. But as Washington moves up the rungs of the escalation ladder, these self-restraints may become irrelevant.
The Americans have always considered it normal to split the unified field of our bilateral relations in a certain way: on the one hand, they officially set themselves the goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, and on the other, they wish to discuss the issue of arms control. Moscow already rejected this dialogue last year. Statements by Russian officials made it clear that dialogue was impossible without a fundamental change in the nature of US-Russian relations.
At the same time, the Americans have always been interested in this simply because they are only in the early stages of modernizing their nuclear forces and it would take many years and a huge amount of money to bring them up to par with ours. They would like to impose some agreements on both Russia and China that will limit us during this period. And then, when they have already established the production and deployment of new strategic nuclear systems, they will waive all restrictions, as they have already done many times with other agreements.
This American cunning will no longer work.
This article was first published by the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta
Attack Russia and be reduced to a ‘stain’ – Medvedev!
Small NATO states that make threats should remember Moscow’s nuclear deterrent, the former president has said
Small NATO members who dream about attacking Russia should know Article 5 is not effective against tactical nuclear weapons, the deputy head of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, has said.
The former Russian president and prime minister was commenting on recent statements by Estonia’s top general about “preemptive” strikes on Russia in the service of NATO objectives.
“The sillier the state, the greater the arrogance of its individual, insane leaders,” Medvedev told reporters on Friday. “People should take into account only one thing: should Russia use, say, tactical nuclear weapons against a state that allows itself such statements, nothing but a stain will remain.”
“Sure, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty may apply, but the state will no longer exist,” Medvedev added, referring to NATO’s famous mutual defense provision.
Medvedev spoke at the Kapustin Yar missile range in Astrakhan Region, the site where the Russian Air Force tests cutting-edge rocket technology.
Earlier this week, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled changes to Moscow’s nuclear doctrine at a meeting of the nation’s Security Council, with Medvedev in attendance. Widely regarded as a message to the US and its allies, as well as Ukraine, the updated doctrine would allow Russia to deploy its nuclear deterrent in case of a conventional attack by a state that is backed by a nuclear power.
The head of the Estonian General Staff, Major General Vahur Karus, said last week that new NATO contingency plans for a conflict with Moscow envisioned the Baltic state launching a strike across the border.
”Our long-range strike capabilities are fully taken into account in NATO plans, and NATO tells us that we have to take care of certain targets [in Russia], and that’s when they can come [to Estonia] and take the next steps,” Karus told the Estonian state broadcaster ERR.
Karus described the new mission as a “fundamental change” to Estonia’s military doctrine, noting that prior to the Ukraine conflict the US-led bloc expected the Baltic state to hold out for about 10 days before it could get NATO reinforcements.
The former Soviet republic joined the organization in 2004 and has been one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine in the conflict with Russia.
Putin’s nuclear doctrine updates are a final warning to the West writes Dmitry Trenin
There are too many people who think the Kremlin is bluffing and they can behave with impunity towards Russia
Vladimir Putin’s decision to update Moscow’s nuclear doctrine isn’t a knee-jerk reaction to current events. Unlike, for example, the threat to attack deeper inside Russia with long-range missiles. The changes were flagged by the Russian president several months ago, and from yesterday’s speech we learned that the Strategic Deterrence Commission meets twice a year, which means that the document itself is constantly being re-read and re-thought.
The merits of strengthening nuclear deterrence became clear more than two years ago, when the US declared that its goal – in the Ukraine conflict – is to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. The West then began its game of escalation. Moscow’s old nuclear doctrine was aimed at other wars and scenarios and proved ineffective at deterring the enemy in the new circumstances.
We will now see the reaction in the West, where unfortunately there are many people in high places who have convinced themselves that Putin is ‘bluffing’, that Russia is ‘afraid to respond’, and that it is therefore possible to behave with impunity toward it. The doctrinal correction is thus essentially a signal to the sober minds that remain in the halls of power in Washington: this is the last warning.
At the same time, there is great anxiety in countries friendly to us – and other simply neutral ones – about the possibility of nuclear war. China may already be thinking about it. Beijing – along with India, Brazil, South Africa, and others – wants an imminent and unconditional end to the hostilities. We need to assure them that strengthening our deterrent is the only way to prevent the general nuclear war to which Washington’s mad and reckless strategy is leading the world.
At the same time, the US has long sought to separate the conflict in Ukraine from discussions of strategic stability and arms control. This would allow it to simultaneously wage war against Russia and obtain guarantees of its own security from Moscow. Understandably, this approach has not been successful. The US has realized this, but it wants to present itself to the international community as a promoter of global security – while framing Russia as an arsonist. It’s a simple trick, but exposing it in the majority countries of the world – I would like to emphasize these words – requires our attention and a concerted effort. The dialogue of trust with our partners must be continued and deepened.
If we are talking about Moscow’s next steps, they are less predictable than the previously announced correction of the nuclear doctrine. They will depend, among other things, on the enemy’s reaction to the president’s remarks yesterday. But it is clear that we will have to move from verbal warnings and demonstrations to practical measures. No one is going to say publicly what kind of action it will entail, and when and where it could happen.