Since the start of the special operation in Ukraine on demilitarisation and denazification, there have been several rounds of talks between Russia and Ukraine. These were initially positioned as a mechanism for the rapid resolution of the crisis situation and were seen (on the Russian side at least) as a real settlement tool capable of arriving at an agreement acceptable to the two sides within a short time frame.

The negotiations took place both in a live format, with meetings taking place in Belarus and Turkey, and in a virtual format. But the more meetings took place, the clearer it became that Ukraine was simply playing for time and would not agree to Russia’s initial demands. Although at first Kiev made rather vague promises that it would not join NATO and would retain its neutral status, later the Ukrainian side began to show hubris. And it did so in an increasingly defiant manner.

In the end, the Ukrainian side actually went on an active diplomatic offensive, reneging on earlier agreements. It is telling that this happened after the murder of one of the members of the Ukrainian delegation, Denis Kireev, in Kyiv. This gave rise to the assumption that any constructive discussions among Ukrainian politicians would be harshly suppressed by the war party, which, in turn, is set on a rigid pro-Western course and confrontation with Russia.

Finally, the day before, Volodymyr Zelensky himself said that Ukraine will fight until victory, and allowed himself a number of politically incorrect phrases. Although at the same time in an interview with Western publications he claims that the only way out of the situation is to negotiate with Russia.[i]
But against the backdrop of European Parliament President Josep Borrell’s words that the end of this conflict must be put on the battlefield, one gets the impression that the EU supports a solution specifically by military means.[ii] If we add to this Kiev’s constant requests for military assistance, partly supported by some countries, Kiev’s ambiguous position clearly reduces the credibility of the negotiation process.

This raises questions. If its continuation is necessary, is it necessary to change the tone and procedure? Should the negotiations proceed in parallel to the military operation and the results, if any, should only consolidate the military gains?

Public opinion polls in tg channels in Russia show that the negotiation format, at least as it has been so far, does not make sense and it is necessary to bring the special operation to its logical conclusion and then sit down at the negotiating table to accept Kiev’s capitulation. The failure of the head of the Russian negotiating team, Vladimir Medinsky, was particularly highlighted.

The head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, even rebuked him for using the wrong wording about possible concessions.[iii] And before that he himself offered to go to the negotiations and solve the problem quickly. On 11 April he promised to liberate the remaining Ukrainian cities from the “Nazis and shaitans” after the DNR and LNR.[iv]

The Ukrainian side naturally saw this as a weakness. This probably partly influenced Kiev’s decision to stage provocations in Bucha and Kramatorsk, with subsequent accusations of Russia. Obviously, information and psychological operations by Ukraine and the West intensified, both on the target audience of Ukrainian citizens and on other countries.

There was also a third party in the negotiations. While Belarus and Turkey acted as mediators, European politicians tried to influence Russian President Vladimir Putin. French President Emmanuel Macron failed to do so. He was followed by other European leaders.

Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer arrived in Moscow on 11 April to meet Vladimir Putin to discuss the situation in Ukraine. Prior to that, he was in Kiev on 9 April, where he met Zelensky. But can he be considered an envoy of the Ukrainian side, even though he is positioning himself as a peacemaker? According to his official statement, the visit was agreed with Germany, hence it can be seen as reflecting to some extent the collective will of Europe.
Nehammer himself tweeted that “humanitarian corridors, a ceasefire and a full investigation of war crimes are needed”. But Russia has repeatedly offered humanitarian corridors and unilaterally ceased fire. This has been used by the AFU and neo-Nazis to shell convoys of refugees and other provocations, if they have agreed to the establishment of corridors at all.

As for the investigation of crimes, this has to start with the incidents in Odessa in May 2014 and other Ukrainian cities that have been bombed and shelled by Ukrainian forces for eight years. Of course, the crimes committed by the Ukrainian security services in recent days in Bucha and Kramatorsk should also be thoroughly and objectively investigated and their initiators and perpetrators punished.

Some media believe that its purpose is to try to free captured (or blocked in Mariupol) NATO instructors and officers.[v]

Since the talks took place behind closed doors with no press allowed and no details made public, this version cannot be discounted. In this case, Russia has a strong trump card to further negotiate with the West, which is, in fact, the main sponsor of the long-running Ukrainian crisis.

Although as a result it is known that the collective West intends to strengthen sanctions against Russia. Well, as the saying goes, if one is aware, one is armed. And Russia will be preparing to introduce an additional package of counter-sanctions against the West.
As far as the Ukrainian side is concerned, first of all, it should be taken into account that Russia and Ukraine have no diplomatic relations at the moment. They were severed at the initiative of the Ukrainian side after Russia recognised the DNR and LNR. Consequently, this creates a new and unique field for international legal interaction. The precedent effectively suspends the previously signed agreements between the two countries, although their implementation can continue.
Reasons for breaking off diplomatic relations include armed conflict, loss of legal personality and unconstitutional change of political leadership. The last point is particularly interesting, as there was a coup d’état in Ukraine in February 2014, which in many ways set the stage for further deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian ties.

Although after the clearly unfair and non-transparent elections in 2014 and Petro Poroshenko’s victory, the Russian side dealt with him. The same was true after Vladimir Zelenski came to power. Although the legitimacy of this succession of the last two presidents is questionable. As for the termination of diplomatic relations, it is important to understand that many states have severed relations with each other over the last 15 years, so the Russian-Ukrainian case is not exceptional. However, the negotiation process itself is of particular interest. Firstly, Ukraine’s territorial claims against Russia are worth nothing. For example, in relations between Japan and Russia there is the intractable problem of the Kuril Islands. Japan and Russia have yet to sign a peace treaty as a result of World War II. And its conclusion is directly linked to Tokyo’s territorial claims. But that does not interfere with bilateral relations and cooperation, which, however, have declined due to the current sanctions. And Japan, despite being a partner of the US, has not even dreamed of returning the Kuril Islands by force.

In Ukraine, according to trophy documents and intelligence reports, there were such plans. Consequently, it is not up to Russia to give guarantees here, but to Ukraine that it will behave quietly and not encroach on the security of Russia and its allies. Ideally, to control such guarantees would require a permanent Russian military and political presence on Ukrainian territory.

The second is Ukraine’s current non-compliance with numerous international conventions, ranging from the proper treatment of Russian prisoners of war to deliberately creating a humanitarian disaster in a number of areas (including the use of military force) in order to blame Russia. Such behaviour clearly undermines trust and exposes Ukraine as a non-compliant party.

Given the numerous problems within the country, against a background of total dysfunction of the authorities (e.g. looting, lynchings and raids), it is clear that the rule of law does not exist as such in Ukraine. If even in domestic politics the Kiev regime has gone beyond the rule of law, is there any point in negotiating further with it?

Probably only if it makes sense if Kiev not only agrees to all the demands previously put forward by Russia, but also fulfils a number of new conditions. Namely:

1) assistance in finding and punishing those responsible for inciting Russophobia and propaganda of neo-Nazi ideology both in and outside of Ukraine through representatives of the Ukrainian state and individual citizens of that country;

2) Full cooperation in the investigation of all crimes committed by the Ukrainian military, special services and paramilitary groups against the Russian military and Ukrainian citizens;

3) Transfer to the Russian side documents of the SBU, the AFU, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and other authorities concerning any measures taken against Ukrainian citizens because of their pro-Russian stance or involvement with the Russian Orthodox Church;

4) Transferring assets from the security services to the reconstruction and restructuring of civilian infrastructure;

5) appealing to the West to lift all sanctions that have been imposed on Russia since 2014.
Preferably, all this should be adopted as a package agreement with specific deadlines for implementation by the Ukrainian side.

[i] https://ria.ru/20220409/zelenskiy-1782690769.html
[ii] https://russian.rt.com/world/news/988803-es-ukraina-borrel
[iii] https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5283225
[iv] https://ria.ru/20220411/kadyrov-1782837904.html
[v] https://www.politnavigator.net/kancler-avstrii-edet-ugovarivat-putina-vypustit-instruktorov-nato-iz-mariupolya.html
Translation by Lorenzo Maria Pacini