It is obvious to everyone that the Zionist regime violates numerous conventions and treaties of international law. If the International Criminal Court has already ruled on the ethnic cleansing that Israel carried out in the Gaza Strip, then the aggression in Lebanon has become another dimension that increases the list of war crimes of the Benjamin Netanyahu regime. The most obvious cases are the use of technical means of communication as a weapon, targeted killings, as well as the disproportionate use of military force.

Quite indicatively, the same cases apply to the United States, since it had previously applied similar actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani with a drone strike on January 3, 2020. For Israel, these cases are a kind of argument to justify their own crimes, since they can be interpreted as case-law. However, from the standpoint of internationally recognized laws, they have committed and are committing crimes that have yet to be not only condemned, but also to push developing a reliable mechanism for the execution of decisions of international agencies, since Israel has not fulfilled the earlier decision of the International Criminal Court and is unlikely to comply.

Let’s look at the events of recent days from a legal point of view. And let’s start with the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

According to the law of war, there are three categories of persons who can become a legitimate target: combatants, members of organized armed groups and civilians directly involved in warfare. Combatants include members of the armed forces of a State who are not medical and religious personnel; members of the militia or volunteer corps who belong to the State under certain conditions; and participants in mass mobilization (Geneva Convention III, article 4). Such people become targets around the clock depending on their status (the so-called “status targeting”), regardless of what kind of activity they are engaged in.

Members of organized armed groups can also legally be targeted at any time. However, Hezbollah is a political party, although it has an armed wing, that is, it performs both civilian and military functions. Therefore, in general, it cannot be qualified as an organized armed group. As for Hassan Nasrallah himself, senior leaders of non-State groups with a military wing may not necessarily be considered members of an organized armed group. This is fair even if they are involved in decision-making at the strategic level of the war, for example, deciding whether to start military action and when. In addition, Nasrallah was not directly involved in the warfare.

It should be noted however that the United States has come up with a mechanism to circumvent these restrictions. The US Department of Defense Law of War Manual stipulates that “an individual who is integrated into the group such that the group’s hostile intent may be imputed to him or her may be deemed to be functionally (i.e., constructively) part of the group, even if not formally a member of the group.” (§ 5.7.3.2). It also says that “leaders who are not members of an armed force or armed group (including heads of State, civilian officials, and political leaders) may be made the object of attack if their responsibilities include the operational command or control of the armed forces.” (§ 5.7.4).

It is indicative that according to the logic of the Pentagon, any person who is not formally a member of a conditional armed group, if he could be attributed hostile intentions, can be registered as part of this group and, accordingly, get on the list for physical elimination. From the point of view of the United States and Israel, Nasrallah was in a bunker where he could have discussed plans of action against Israel, which means that he was directly involved in the fighting during the Israeli strike.

That said, several bunker buster bombs were used, which produced “a series of synchronized explosions aimed at penetrating the underground bunker.” At least four buildings collapsed as a result, and according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health, at least 11 people were killed and 108 injured (figures are not final).

This leaves the issue of compliance with the rule of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that are expected to result in accidental civilian casualties, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) that is excessive in relation to the specific and direct military advantage that the attacker expects to gain. Obviously, in this case, the expected collateral damage was significant due to the weapons used and the location of the target – a residential area.

At the same time, the adopted decapitation strategy is questionable, since a replacement will be found for the murdered leaders one way or another. It has often happened in history that someone more competent and active came to replace. Israel could only count on short-term benefits due to the violation of the organization’s command and control. Israel probably pursued similar goals when it used pagers and radio stations as weapons.

Here it is necessary to pay attention to Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which concerns, in particular, booby traps. An international treaty defines a booby trap as “any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.” (CCW Protocol II, Article 2(2); Amended CCW Protocol II, Article 2(2)).

On December 21, 2001, the scope of application of the CCW and its Protocols was expanded to cover non-international armed conflicts. However, this extension of scope comes into force only for States that ratify this extension. Israel has not ratified this extension, although it is a party to Amended Protocol II, which also, among other things, considers booby traps and defines them in terms identical to those above (CCW, Amended Protocol II, Article 2(4)).

The following should be noted from the provisions of Amended Protocol II. It is necessary to warn in advance about the use of booby traps, unless circumstances allow it. It is obvious that Israel deliberately used pagers and radio stations as booby traps and did not intend to warn about their use.

The main prohibitions regarding the use of booby traps are contained in paragraph 2 of Article 7, which reads as follows: “It is prohibited to use booby-traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material.” Since the devices were triggered as mines after the signal was given, they fall under the scope of Article 7 (2) and are therefore prohibited on this basis.

In addition, according to article 3, it is prohibited to use such weapons, to which this article applies,  in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects. in which there is no fighting between ground forces or which does not seem to be inevitable, except in cases where either:

(a) they are located at or in the immediate vicinity of a military installation; or

(b) Measures are taken to protect the civilian population from their effects, for example, warning posts are set up, warnings are issued or fences are installed.

Consequently, Israel deliberately used prohibited weapons and used them against the civilian population.

It should be added that there are other prohibitions and restrictions in Article 7 of Amended Protocol II. In the previous treaty, they were defined as “manually installed ammunition and devices designed to kill, maim or damage and activated remotely or automatically after a certain time” (article 2 (3)).

In Amended Protocol II, the definition of “other devices” is as follows: manually-emplaced munitions and devices including improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are activated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time. (article 2 (5)).

Also, according to the weapons act, all States are legally obliged to proof test all new types of weapons before using them in armed conflict. This obligation follows from other provisions of international law, including common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article 51 (4) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, reflecting customary international law, prohibits indiscriminate attacks, that is, attacks that are not directed against a military facility or that use weapons or methods that are indiscriminate in nature.

An example of indiscriminate attacks specifically referred to in articles 51 (5)(b) and 57 of the Additional Protocol I is an attack that violates the rule of proportionality (i.e., which can be expected to result in accidental civilian casualties, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in comparison with an expected concrete and direct military advantage).

Therefore, as in the case of hitting residential areas with aerial bombs, the detonation of pagers violates the rule of proportionality, which is mandatory for all States that are engaged in warfare. It is doubtful that the Zionist regime has taken any care at all to make sure that the attack using pagers is aimed at a “legitimate target”, the civilian population is protected and the rule of proportionality will not be violated. For this reason, many states, including Russia, have classified this dubious operation as an act of state terrorism.

All these nuances are very important for understanding the double standards of the collective West, which stands on the side of Israel and does not worry at all about gross violations of international law.

(headline photo: The IDF stated that their air raids hit approximately 290 Hezbollah sites. 07.10.2024)