My talk will focus on the sociology of ideologemes. I am not going to touch upon the philosophical issues. By ideologemes I mean concepts condensed into specific formulations, into nodal or semantic phenomena. They can be used to unite Russian society and the Russian-speaking world. I would also like to touch upon the ideologemes that can be addressed to the West or, more generally, to the outside world. We all understand that peace leads to war, and war leads to peace. But what kind of peace should it be? I believe that people who give meaning to our world are writers, poets, monks, science fiction writers. The job of philosophers is to give birth to meanings, to manifest them in words for people who don’t get involved in making meanings. Philosophy does not always consider ideologemes, but they are important for today’s reality.
I perceive ideologemes in an instrumental or operational way. The thing is that people have to be in line with the ideologemes in place. I am in agreement with those who said earlier that it is impossible to express an idea and then renounce it. We have to take real steps in the socio-political agenda by declaring that we are moving in a certain direction. Ideologies cannot be used in a thoughtless way.
By enemy, I mean a network of channels spreading Western propaganda, as well as pro-Western agents, covert and overt. Our confrontation is existential. The enemy has a lot of old tricks up its sleeve, especially the concept of the Russian barbarian, which has been in use for a long time. When the idea of “orcs” appeared, I began to study this problem. On the Internet there is information that the “orcs” were raised to the black flag on the 24th of February. There is a clear intersection with the concept of the “Russian barbarian” that dates back to the Polish Wars, to the 17th century. Perhaps this is a kind of semantic evolution – from Russian barbarian to orc.
It is important to note that the enemy is working against us on several levels. It is a narrow ethnic level, which is usually characteristic of the Ukrainian mass media, as well as the Russian-language mass media, which work for both Ukrainian and Russian audiences. They also use such terms as “rusnya”, “katsap”. They use extremely negative meanings to pump up the audience. The concept we have to work with is Rus-Ukraine. This concept is perceived by the enemy as a positive one. It should develop within the framework of the Ukrainian state. I’ll come back to that later.
What concepts can be addressed to the domestic and Russian-speaking public? I have highlighted several blocks. The first block is the integrity of the perception of Russian history. It is obvious that there is a split in our society between the right and the left. I think it should be overcome by understanding Russia and Russian as a concept of civilisation. In this way, we can avoid a war of words. Each side has its own truth. But if we continue to think in terms of “right” and “left”, it will not lead to anything good. We will not be able to agree or create new ground. Instrumentally, attention should be drawn to public and cultural figures who have not forgotten their ethnic roots. Those who saw their supreme task in working for the benefit of the common state. We need to focus on recordings of speeches by such public figures, in which they manifested their commitment to Russian civilisation. At the same time, it is important to note the differences at the ethnic level. If an ethnic Great Russian can identify himself as a member of Russian civilisation, this makes him a Russian Great Russian. If a Georgian was brought up in Russian culture, listened to Russian fairy tales, studied in a Russian school – this makes him a Russian-Georgian. This combination reflects two levels at once – ethnic and civilisational.
The next ideologeme is that the reason for a modern war or a special military operation is the collapse of a common state. When they say that Russia is the aggressor, we reply that the war began eight years ago, and it wasn’t Russia that started it. But we should go back to the collapse of the Soviet Union and look for the cause of the war in that event. The logic is simple. If the territory had remained united, and even if the capitalist project had been launched, it would have remained a political community, so that what is happening today would be impossible.
Historical analogies are not always accurate, but they can be found in mass consciousness. Russian writers and philosophers use analogies in their works. It should be noted that after the reunification of the lands, certain improvements always occur in the newly united territory. So it was after the collapse of the Russian Empire, so it was after the restoration of the royal dynasty in the 17th century.
The ideologeme of the Tsar-Deliverer is a very interesting point. For example, K.V. Chistov’s book Socio-Utopian Legends of the Russian People examines a wide range of ethnographic material. The author argues that there is an idea of the Tsar-Deliverer in the Russian consciousness, or more precisely in the Great Russian consciousness (the research material was collected in Moscow and the Golden Ring region). This Tsar-Deliverer is a figure who goes to the common people, sees their problems and then returns to his palace to lead his people to the ideal and to justice. It is important to note that socio-utopian legends are those legends that caused real social actions by a person or, more often, a group of people. This myth was widely used after the split of the Church in a series of uprisings and riots. Now this ideologeme can be used in the format of a transition from V.V. Putin’s idea that he is an effective manager to the idea of a father of a nation, a tsar-deliverer in disguise who will take the case and fix everything. These are the subtleties of rhetoric. We are not talking about a manager who just follows what happens, but someone who takes what happens to heart. This makes such a person an ataman, a head of the family or community. With all the anarchist centrifugal tendencies that existed in the Russian community, it was the position of the head that centred these tendencies. Working with the ideology of the Tsar-deliverer, the concept of community can be extended to the state.
My friend Vladimir Yurtaev suggested the ideologeme of “Red Geography”. By this ideology he meant the land on which the blood of a Russian soldier was shed. This concept expands on ideas expressed in Soviet times, such as “sacred land”. It was also invoked in the Russian Empire. It is important that this ideologeme can be used against us, for example by Poles who can claim that they and their ancestors also shed blood for the territory of modern Ukraine. In this case, our counter-argument will be that as a result of the war for this territory, we came to the people who were culturally united with us, who had a common faith. Red geography is a concept associated with the restoration of the cultural integrity of a people with common roots.
The next block is power and faith. What I am going to say next will sound a little rude, but I think it is necessary to point this out by returning to the concept that is working against us. It is believed that Ukraine-Rus is the centre of the “gathering” of Slavic countries. But this formation has little to do with the Christian faith – it is closer to paganism and neo-paganism. So, we have to confront the enemy with our own ideologemes. I see such an ideologeme as the disclosure of concepts related to deification and hesychasm, which will be able to attract the attention and even reforge people from that side. Approaching the study of these questions, I came to the conclusion that the pulpit of the Pope in the bosom of the Catholic Church closes upon itself the reflection of the uncreated light. This allows the Pope to say things from the pulpit that are considered sacred. In Orthodoxy, the ideas of the Church Father Gregory Palamas have been rejected about six times. The seventh time these ideas became dogmatic, which also speaks of the intensity, the unimaginability, the illogicality of the concepts and ideas that Gregory Palamas expressed. Nevertheless, the Church Father spoke of divine energies – not of God Himself in the created world, but of divine energies saturating this world. Such a view can serve as a bridge to pagans and neo-pagans – it is necessary to work with them institutionally.
As an ideologeme we can also consider the Easter character of Russian culture. This emphasis is not on the birth of Christ, which is characteristic of Catholicism, but on his resurrection; on the fact that death can be overcome, that the idea can transcend the limits of the material world, serve to unite and transform people, play a positive role in the modern situation.
The last block is a war for the traditional future. I think it is extremely important to constantly push our intellectual circles to think about creating an image of the future. There is a main agenda – it is denazification and demilitarisation. But both have an internal negative connotation – which is what we are fighting against. It is necessary to create a field of meaning in which we clearly indicate what we are fighting for. I think the answer is simple – this is a war for the traditional future. It is no longer a special military operation – that stage is over. Certain successes have been achieved – it’s time to move on to the categories of war. With the help of the “war for the traditional future” I am moving away from the territorial concepts of “war in Ukraine”, “war for Ukraine”, which look as if we are taking something away from someone. But if we are talking about the war for the traditional future, then we have to take it to its logical conclusion. Some things have already been revealed in Russian society – for example, the rejection of the propaganda of the LGBT community and its ideas. Nevertheless, abortion is still included in Russia’s compulsory health insurance, which is strange for a country that stands for traditional values. We need to approach this issue holistically: consider what needs to be done and start doing it. Then we will be able to use this ideology without contradicting ourselves, but as a civilisation of truth.
This war is also about the Russian language. When they ask, “What are we fighting for?” “For the Russian language!” is the answer. When the Russian language lost its status as the second state language in Ukraine, a war was essentially declared against a civilisation, against a people. I won’t surprise anyone when I say that language is the heart of a people. If a person forgets his language, he automatically loses a living connection with his people. In my opinion, this idea has the right to be postulated, to be formalised in certain concepts and to be defended in society.
I am not approaching an ideologeme here, but an idea, because I believe that this is a broader concept. This is the idea of the traditionalist international front. I note that I am not insisting on such a formulation, but I hope that everyone understands what is at stake. If we fight the war for the traditional future within Russia, if we show it, if it becomes clear, then we will be able to use the same idea in an international format. Russia has the right to do this, both historically and spiritually. Russia is a messianic country. With all due respect to China and India, we keep this mission as an internal content, independent of the Soviet Union. But it was in Russia, under the banner of spiritual transformation and striving for a new world, that a revolution took place that ideologically should have taken place in the industrialised countries. Here we should recall John Reed’s description of the rally of the trade union movement in Germany. Equally dressed people in bowler hats sat on both sides discussing an absolutely social agenda: “Should people work 8 hours or 12 hours? On the other hand, John Reed saw a trade union meeting in Russia where a man jumped up on a table and began to speak – and John Reed felt that people hesitated a little. The speaker fell silent, and in that pause people seemed ready to break into Communism.
Later this movement took on other forms, but internally it remained a movement of the spirit. It is the same international front, traditionalist or traditional – we have to think what to call it. A certain force has matured not only in Russia, but all over the world. This force is not divided along left-right lines, but manifests itself in two ideas, two concepts – the idea of the social justice of the economy on the one hand, and the idea of the traditional value of culture on the other. This is how we can get a lot of support from outside Russia. This idea can become the very modern idea that Marxism once was, which nevertheless remained a product of modern ideology – not of our land, but something that was brought to it. Although it should be noted that this ideology gave rise to truly Russian ideas, such as the transformation of the flesh, the transformation of the state – something supernatural. Today, the idea of an international traditionalist front has the same internal potency.
To sum up, I will focus on the fact that the most important thing is to approach the disclosure of the ideologeme of war for the traditional world within oneself. Later, we can move towards highlighting it with actions within Russia, through governmental and grassroots social activity, to the disclosure of this phenomenon throughout the world.
Moderator:
We need to get away from the left-right opposition, because we are trapped in it. In world practice, the philosophical idea of avoiding the confrontation between left and right is also outlined. This idea is very relevant in terms of the consciousness of civilisational identity. Moreover, Russianness is a civilisational identity. This idea can reconcile the nominal right and left: for example, the nominal Egor Kholmogorov as the right and the nominal Zakhar Prilepin as the left. Eurasists, nationalists, monarchists – they can all be united. I think that some of the outlined ideologies can be developed in the future, for example Red Geography. I remember Alexey Ivanov’s wonderful stereosophical novel The Heart of Parma, in which one of the characters asks a question about the land: “When will this land finally be ours? The local shaman replies: “When we soak it three metres deep with our blood”. I think this is also a very interesting formula. The last thing I would like to mention is the understanding of the current conflict as a war for language, not only for the Russian language, but also for the Ukrainian language, which has to be freed from the alluvial Polish influence. According to Martin Heidegger, the war for language turns out to be a war for being. Thus, the ontological, social roots of this conflict become visible to us.
Questions:
About reconciliation. I think there can be no compromise in the struggle for truth. The Russian is striving to reach the end of the truth, to reach its fullness. That is why we are not going to reconcile here, and that is a big problem. Our forum reveals a situation that will only be resolved by the war we have entered. The truth of Russia is victorious.
A philosopher is a hero of being who does not negotiate agreements about truth. For him, truth is not a matter of agreement. Philosophy is unconventional, so the philosopher searches for the ultimate truth. Our meeting really reveals some problems in the public, intellectual and philosophical space. We are working in search of solutions to these problems, and then, come what may.
Translated by Daria Seregina