This interview by Pavel Kiselev with history and geopolitics expert Alexander Bovdunov addresses the current reality of Eastern Europe. The book that Bovdunov has just published has had a wide resonance among Russian conservatives and has become essential to study the political and philosophical processes in Eastern Europe.
Kiselev: Alexander, how long have you been interested in the subject of Eastern Europe? Why did you start studying it?
Bovdunov: I started studying Romania when I was a student at MGIMO. My second foreign language was Romanian. Then I developed an interest in Romanian Orthodox conservative thought and, coincidentally, at the same time I started translating something, which then turned into a broader and more complex interest in the [Eastern European] region. Then it turned out that the notion of “region” does not apply well to this complex structure of border character. In essence, the region is a fluctuating border between Russia and Europe. Next, the questions of what to do with this border and what alternatives to the current geopolitical situation could be developed into an academic interest, in a doctoral thesis on an alternative geopolitical reorganization of Europe. I was interested in the problem of what alternatives to their status quo Eastern Europeans see. Eventually it turned into a book, published by chance at a hot time when interest in the region had grown significantly.
Kiselev: When did you start writing the book?
Bovdunov: The main body was written in 2012-13 while I was preparing and defending my doctorate in political science. Then I updated it, wrote several new chapters entirely devoted to the philosophical spaces of Eastern Europe. That is, the book was written with interruptions: first in the years 2010 and updated in the years 2020 and 21.
Kiselev: You said that interest in Eastern Europe increased during the “hot times”. Did the special military operation have any impact on the content of the book, did you make any additions after it began?
Bovdunov: Unfortunately, there was not, because the book had already been printed at that point. Conceptually, however, nothing changed in the region. Rather, the Atlanticist strategies of controlling the region and expanding as a “buffer zone” to the east, as outlined in the book, have become even more pronounced. It is clear that the position of some politicians is also changing, as some openly pro-Russian authors have had to be silenced. However, we can already see that this trend is changing. That is, pundits are starting to speak out against arms supplies to Ukraine, for normalization of relations with Russia and so on. I think, in fact, everything will return to normal. Also, the more successful Russia is, the better, paradoxically, it will be treated. The stronger Russia is in SMO, the better will be the attitude toward it of those who have so far taken a skeptical and wait-and-see attitude, but are not ready to accept the degeneration and degradation caused by modern Western civilization. A strong Russia will have to be taken into consideration, and conservative and traditionalist forces (in the broad sense of the term) will see in a strong Russia support. Many already believe that Russia should be the center of attention, that it is an important player in the geopolitical arena, challenging the West.
Kiselev: In this context, how do you see relations between Russia and Eastern Europe after the end of the special operation?
Bovdunov: I think the current cooling is temporary and they will have to seek dialogue in the future. And then the anti-Atlantic and continental geopolitical concepts, even if they are just ideas now and are not supported by many, will have a role to play and will have to be addressed. The important thing is to have ideas, and the ideas are there. They live alongside us, and it seems to me that there will be some reorientation, at least in the countries where there are serious pro-Russian positions, for example, in Bulgaria and Slovakia. With Poland it is complicated, because in many ways we are at the antipodes, and the Polish-Russian dispute is not so much a dispute between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, but between two great powers that have tried to concentrate hegemony in their hands in this part of Europe. Russia has succeeded, Poland has not. The question arises: was the choice Poland made the right one? Polish imperial nostalgia manifests itself in various ways: in Promethean politics, in the Jagellonian idea, which is discussed in my book, and in a kind of “nostalgia” for the Russian Empire! On this topic I can also recommend a book by the Polish writer Mariusz Swider entitled “How we built Russia”. It is a very popular book in Poland- there are many editions and Poles take an active interest in it. It describes the role of Poles in the history of Russia, the number of Poles who served in the army, government and police of the Russian Empire higher than any other ethnic group, how they participated in the creation of Russian culture. And so, they feel nostalgia for the greatness that this gave. We propose to seek this greatness together with Russia, not against Russia, not at the expense of Western liberal doctrines, which will eventually destroy Poland. It makes no sense for Polish “winged hussars” to go against Russia if the LGBT community comes from the rear with “feathers”. The threat to their identity does not come from Russia.
Kiselev: Your book has made a positive impression on much of the conservative community in Russia, because the topic of Eastern Europe is on the agenda for many at the moment. Tell me, are there any Russian studies on this region, or parts of it, philosophical or geopolitical, that you could cite that might have influenced your work as well?
Bovdunov: First of all, Noomakhia by Alexander G. Dugin, two volumes that deal directly with the regions of Eastern Europe. In general, he was influenced by the discussions that took place within the Center for Conservative Studies in the 2010s. I think these are exemplary works that need to be read. As for other Russian works, I don’t think many serious works are published today. You can look for translations of Lithuanian authors, for example by Antanas Maceina, brilliantly translated by Maxim Medovarov and also Romanian authors.
Kiselev: In your book, you point out that in addition to Noomakhia, your book was influenced by Dugin’s other works, Geopolitics and Fundamentals of Geopolitics. Do concepts such as the civic approach and fourth political theory play a role in your research?
Bovdunov: The civic approach, yes. As for the 4PT, I don’t write about it directly. But there is a section in the book titled “Great Eastern Europe: awakening or reset”, which talks about the concepts of great awakening and how one can conduct a counter-hegemonic discourse, linked to the notion of “third traditionalism” – an appeal to the peasant horizon. This, in my view, combines with 4PT. The very phenomenon of Eastern European populism is precisely an attempt to overcome the left-right dichotomy, which is essentially an expression and reflection of the same Enlightenment project, but in different forms. So, it partly overlaps with the concepts of what Alexander Gellievich calls the Fourth Political Theory.
Kiselev: Regarding the civilizational approach, do you see Eastern Europe as a separate civilization, or are there too many internal contradictions that prevent that?
Bovdunov: No, this region cannot be considered a separate civilization, it is a contact ground of various civilizations: Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic. Another thing is that there is something common in this field from which the Greater Eastern Europe project can be built, that is, the conservative component that is obviously present in these countries and is partly related to us. There is an additional layer, the peasant horizon, because Eastern Europe is the cradle of the European peasant, where the Great Mother civilization overlaps with Dionysism (Dionysus comes from Eastern Europe, from Thrace). And these philosophical horizons are also important in finding common ground. There are moments of overlap even in the Slavic idea, because it would seem that Panslavism and Eurasianism are hardly compatible, but, in fact, we should turn to the deep dimension of the Slavic idea, to language, to linguistic research, to attempts to form philosophy on the basis of language.
Thus, the Macedonian philosopher Branislav Sarkanyac points out that we can trace how the philosophical concepts found in the South Slavic languages went a long way from the Greek tradition, to Latin, to German, to Russian, to Serbian, and so on. We had Cyril and Methodius, there was a tradition of translation from Greek, which was essentially a translation from philosophical Greek, the language of the New Testament and Christian Platonism. Why don’t we turn together to the tradition of Cyril and Methodius? This is already an interesting challenge. Instead of going through a chain of meaning loss, we can make an attempt to reach out to antiquity and our common tradition of Cyril and Methodius. The image of Cyril and Methodius is important for us Serbs and Slovaks, who have the cross of Cyril and Methodius in our coat of arms. One can find deep Russian and Slavic tendencies in Slovaks. We can find mutual influences of philosophical tendencies: the Slovaks have a philosophical school, founded by Nikolai Loski. We are united with the Poles by the figure of Thaddeus Zelinsky, an interesting and great specialist of antiquity and founder of the idea of Slavic Renaissance. In general, there are many different layers that intersect and overlap, and this is what makes the region so interesting.
Kiselev: What conclusions do you draw from your book and what are your hopes for the future of Eastern Europe?
Bovdunov: The conclusion is that we can build a project for Eastern Europe. The project will respect the identity of the region. The Eastern European countries must turn to underlying philosophical horizons that unite them, on the one hand. On the other hand, pragmatic and geopolitical aspects play an important role. In order to do so, we must first put an end to Western-centrism, which prevents Eastern Europe from catching up with the West, because the discourse itself is currently constructed in such a way that it cannot catch up; Eastern Europe is forever forced to be the internal “Other” of the West, copying it, eliminating its characteristics, while Russia is the external “Other”. What is projected onto the image of the “Other” is what Europe currently denies in itself. To break out of this vicious circle, it is necessary for the “other” Europe to become the “other Europe”. It is necessary to seek its alternative in Tradition and together with Russia.
Translation by Costantino Ceoldo