In light of the ongoing confrontation between Ethiopia, Egypt and Somalia, the internal political conflict in the south of the latter creates even more opportunities for bargaining, which is one of the tactics of non-military resolution of the conflict surrounding Somaliland.
Federalism in Somalia
Following the collapse of Somali statehood against the background of the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991, the country was plunged into a situation of ongoing struggle between political parties, religious groups, criminal formations and various clans. In 2004-2012, most of Somalia (with the exception of Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence in 1991) had a transitional government based on the principles of federalism, which was reflected in the Provisional Constitution of 2012. To date, the authority of the federal centre in Mogadishu is recognised (with some reservations) by 5 autonomous regions: Puntland (the ‘mother of Somali federalism’), Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South West State of Somalia and Jubaland, although Somaliland is still formally part of Somalia.
Conflict between Mogadishu and Jubaland: reasons and development
In March of 2024, the Somali parliament supported the federal government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, by voting to amend the constitution. In accordance with the changes, it was supposed to switch to a system of direct universal suffrage instead of the existing model, where the heads of regional governments and the president of the country are elected by parliamentarians. Such a move was sharply criticised by some of the regional elites; the Puntland government, for example, immediately announced a boycott of such initiatives.
In late October and early November, 2024, with the upcoming presidential elections in Jubaland, tensions began to rise in Mogadishu’s relations with the southernmost region of the country, a kind of outpost for the fight against Al-Shabab* terrorists (*organisation banned in the Russian Federation). In early November, in Kismayo, the capital of Jubaland, it was decided to form an election commission to conduct elections based on indirect voting, which in no way corresponded to the federal centre’s view. On November 25, having received the support of 55 of the 75 deputies of the regional legislature, Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’ (one of the key political heavyweights in southern Somalia) was re-elected for his third consecutive term as president of Jubaland. The next day, federal troops were deployed to the town of Ras Kamboni on the border with Kenya, but detachments loyal to Ahmed Madobe managed to block the city, as well as other strategically important settlements on the borders of Jubaland.
On November 29, 2024, the President of Jubaland issued an ultimatum to Mogadishu. Ahmed Madobe demanded the withdrawal of federal troops from Ras Kamboni within 15 days, promising that the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud would otherwise ‘pay a high price’.
Prospects of conflict dynamics and their impact on the regional balance of power
Although federal forces and Jubaland militias have not yet engaged in direct clashes, the risk of escalation is extremely high. In addition, besides the already acute intra-Somali contradictions, the conflict between Mogadishu and Kismayo is fuelled by the highly unstable political situation in the Horn of Africa as a whole. This almost one-year confrontation over the Somaliland Port of Berbera between Ethiopia, on the one hand, and Somalia, Egypt and Eritrea, on the other, evokes a constant desire in regional actors to weaken their opponents and/or enlist the support of various quasi-state entities.
Perhaps the most obvious beneficiary of the current conflict is Ethiopia. Firstly, for the resource-limited Somali government, any new internal clash becomes a significant obstacle to pursuing a more or less clear foreign policy course. Secondly, over the years of its presence in Somalia as a key force in the fight against radical Islamists, Ethiopia has secured friendly relations with a number of Somali clans and autonomies. Unsurprisingly, rumours surfaced in early December about Addis Ababa’s military support to Jubaland.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; research intern at the Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations