The situation in the Middle East has grown more tense in the past weeks following Iran’s intensive rocket attacks on Israel to avenge the assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders in Lebanon and Iran and Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iranian territory.
Fears of the Gulf monarchs
According to sources close to government circles in those countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and other Gulf states are worries that their own oil infrastructure may come under fire from Tehran’s allies in case of further escalation of the conflict. Part of those forces are located in Yemen, part in Iraq, i.e. to the north and south of the Persian Gulf. Within the framework of trying not to be caught in the crossfire, Gulf states – including the UAE and Bahrain – that have diplomatic relations with Israel since the end of 2020, are saying that they will not allow Israeli fighter jets cross their airspace during any attacks on Iran, and of this they have notified Washington. But to whom and when have the US listened when acting in the interests of the protection of the strategic partner Israel? It seems the answer is evident.
It is unclear to which degree Benjamin Netanyahu, who pays little attention to international calls and does not abide by any international laws or rules, will agree to a non-escalatory reaction vis-à-vis Iran. Netanyahu knows perfectly well that US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, who is running for president in the November elections, are clearly demanding a balanced reactions so as to avoid a deterioration of the situation in the region before the presidential elections. «Netanyahu, ‘our dear son of a bitch’, do as you please».
No one of these countries wants to participate directly or indirectly in adding fuel to the fire. Arab countries are worried about how far the US will go in terms of providing military protection if they are attacked regardless of who will be sitting in the Oval Office following this year’s elections.
The Saudis still have not recovered from the shock of when ex-president Donald Trump did not even lift a finger when in 2019 Yemeni rockets and UAVs hit Aramco facilities. At that time, Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for the organisation of the terrorist attack, as a result of which half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production was halted. Of course Tehran denied its involvement; Yemeni Ansar Allah claimed responsibility. Then-president Trump only reacted with words of condolence. In 2022, when Biden was president, the Houthis also attacks oil facilities in the UAE and the US, yet again, provided no support.
Prospects for price increases on ‘black gold’
The attack of oil facilities may become a serious blow to Iran, but global oil markets have the capacity to compensate for the loss of the entire Iranian oil production. However, the consequences will be more notable, especially for China and other large importers of Iranian oil. If the markets will react to the increase of oil prices to more than $100 per barrel, the prices at US gas stations will increase. This will negatively impact Harris’ chances of becoming president in November.
High oil prices would be beneficial to Gulf states exporting oil, as a large part of global capacity (свободных мощностей) is located in this region, especially in Saudi Arabia. There are still, however, fears that Iranian allies may attack oil facilities in the Persian Gulf. The representative of the Iraqi Shi’a resistance Kata’ib Hezbollah wrote on Telegram that “the world will lose 12 million barrels of oil per day” if Israel were to strike Iran’s oil facilities one day and threatened to carry out an attack in response, targeting “US bases, camps and interests in Iraq and the region”. Even though oil field were not directly mentioned in the statement of Kata’ib Hezbollah, they seem to be possible targets.
Visits of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi just visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar to discuss de-escalation and to offer dialogue to the Arab neighbours of Iran. The goal of his visit was an attempt to ‘neutralise’ the Persian Gulf in the case of future conflict with Israel. The fact that Araghchi was welcomed by high-ranking government officials both in Riyadh and Doha shows that the two states are ready to abstain from participating in the Iranian-Israeli confrontation. CNN reported that “Iran has been particularly interested in getting help from Saudi Arabia in preventing further Israeli attacks and using their influence with Washington to help find a solution to the crisis”.
Araghchi’s visit took place at a time when the Iranian press was expecting that Iranian regional allies would be forced to react in case of an Israeli attack on Iran. Gulf states were, all in all, publicly expressing that they favour dialogue and cooperation. It seems that this will, indeed, be the case, even though most Gulf states are dissatisfied with Iran trying to extend its influence onto the entire region via armed groups under its control.
Saudi Arabia – possible the most influential member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which united the Gulf states – is on the path of normalization and cooperation with Iran. This is taking place despite the years of Saudi confrontation with the Houthis in Yemen and its opposition of Hezbollah in Lebanon – and Syria.
Professor Andrew Hammond of Oxford University remarked that the rapprochement of Saudi Arabia and Iran is credible and will most likely lead to Gulf states opposing any Israeli attacks on Iran.
Israel struck Iran’s military facilities on the night of 26 October, but not nuclear or oil facilities. But if Tehran’s response follows, how long will Israel refrain from launching a large-scale strike against Iran’s oil industry facilities, as well as those related to the Islamic republic’s nuclear programme?
Viktor Mikhin, corresponding member of RANS