Turkey remains deeply engaged in consolidating its position in war-torn Syria, a development that displeases both internal and external actors. Is Erdoğan prepared to compromise, or does he believe in achieving a complete victory?

Israel, another active participant in efforts to topple Assad’s regime, aims to neutralise the Syrian transit of Iranian weapons to Lebanon, dismantle Hezbollah bases, deepen intra-Islamic divisions between Sunnis and Shia (including Alawites), and legitimise the occupation of the Golan Heights while extending Israel’s secure borders.

Turkey’s Success and Its Plans in Syria

Turkey’s achievements in Syria have positioned it to advance its strategic objectives:

– installing pro-Turkish forces in power, represented by Sunni radicals such as HTS* leader Muhammad al-Jolani, in alliance with Turkmen factions from the SNA.

– satisfying US and Israeli interests by weakening and dislodging Shia-dominated Iranian influence in Syria.

– militarily and politically suppressing Kurdish resistance by targeting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the local People’s Defense Units (YPG).

– establishing a 30-kilometre “buffer security zone” in northwestern Syrian provinces, coupled with ethnic cleansing, replacing Kurdish populations with Turkmen and Sunni Arabs.

– forming a 300,000-strong Syrian army under Turkish and HTS* control to guarantee Ankara’s political, economic, and military interests in Syria.

– advancing lucrative economic projects, such as a Qatari gas pipeline through Syria to Turkey and Europe.

– gaining control over key international transit routes through Syria.

– facilitating the return of 3 million Syrian refugees from Turkey, thereby reducing Ankara’s budgetary burden and expanding its pro-Turkish electorate.

Erdoğan has demonstrated his ability to bide his time, play multiple sides, and portray himself as a “reliable friend”. He has fortified economic and other ties with Russia, reaping substantial benefits from this relationship, including billions of dollars in construction contracts in Russia, mass Russian tourism, and, most importantly, cheap Russian gas, pipelines, and nuclear power projects. Erdoğan also successfully resolved the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, at least temporarily, to the benefit of the Ankara-Baku tandem.

While Turkey has undoubtedly achieved significant success in Syria, the result is a fractured, contradictory, economically devastated country with the potential for further conflict.

Irreconcilable Differences, Compromises, or New Conflicts in the Syrian Theatre?

Syria remains fraught with challenges, including external and internal political pressures, economic instability, social unrest, and unresolved issues concerning governance, national and religious minorities, and more. Resolving these issues is an overwhelming task that cannot be achieved overnight. If the matter were confined to Syrians alone, it is likely that the society could eventually find a path forward. However, Syria has become a focal point for the ambitions of numerous regional and global powers. This inevitably leads to conflict, where the maximalism of some and the intransigence of others continue to turn the territory of what remains of the Syrian Arab Republic into a stage for potential new clashes.

The US Seeks to Strengthen Its Position in the Middle East by prioritising its key ally, Israel, and reasserting control over the wealthy Arab monarchies. Washington supports Syrian Kurds and is likely to attempt to secure control over oil fields and infrastructure in Kurdish-populated provinces. Additionally, Syria serves as a geographical point of engagement with Iran for the US. Former President Donald Trump’s pro-Israel stance remains a warning to Tehran.

What Objectives Does Tel Aviv Pursue in Syria?

Israel aims to dismantle Hezbollah’s resistance, eliminate the Syrian-Iranian alliance, annex the Golan Heights occupied in 1967, establish a “buffer zone” of security (potentially encompassing a larger portion of Syria’s southwest), and expand its strategic reach towards Iran. Tel Aviv regards Syrian Druze and Kurds as its allies in this endeavour. Israel has also not overlooked threats from Turkey and its unfriendly diplomatic moves. Moreover, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already deployed Israeli forces into Syrian territory and shows no intention of withdrawing, justifying this presence as a measure to ensure Israel’s security against the unforeseen actions of local Islamist radicals who have risen to power. Despite its critical stance towards the Assad regime, Israel acknowledges that both Assad senior and junior adhered to the terms of the 1974 agreement, making them predictable actors. Furthermore, Mossad possesses an extensive network of agents within radical Islamist groups, where HTS* is seemingly no exception. Consequently, if deemed necessary, Israeli intelligence is capable of orchestrating provocations to substantiate threats against the Jewish state.

Netanyahu has made it explicitly clear that no one will convince him of the merit of withdrawing Israeli troops from Syria’s Sweida and Quneitra provinces. He has already conveyed this stance to the new authorities in Damascus.

The situation appears to primarily involve Turkey, whose Ministry of Defence issued a routine statement asserting that Turkish air defence systems would target Israeli aircraft if they threaten Turkish interests in Syrian Kurdistan. While Erdoğan continues to issue verbal threats against Israel, the reality is that any Turkish action would provoke a harsh response from the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and American forces.

Israel has already deployed its troops to southern Syria. If Turkey is genuinely concerned about the security of a new Syria and its territorial integrity, what is preventing Erdoğan and the new leader of the radical offshoot of Syrian al-Qaeda* from acting on their threats against this violator?

Iran’s Role in Post-Assad Syria

Iran remains cautious, observing developments within and around Syria. The Iranian embassy in Damascus, under HTS* control, has already been attacked, resulting in the death of another Iranian diplomat. Local Shia and Alawite communities have become targets of executions and abuse. Amid these tensions, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has called on Syrian youth to rise against the Turkish-backed HTS* regime.

Russia Refocuses While China Observes

Russia has refrained from making bold statements on Syria, possibly preoccupied with identifying new locations for its military bases, potentially in North Africa. Reports from The Moscow Times suggest Sudan’s government may have declined Russia’s naval base request, though these claims remain unverified.

Moscow is unlikely to partner with Turkey in its Syrian ventures. Once Russia resolves the Ukraine issue on its terms and improves relations with the US, it may remind Turkey of its dependency on Russian gas, nuclear energy, tourism, and business ties.

The Assad regime has received significant investments from China, amounting to nearly $20 billion. Beijing is not known for forgiving anti-Chinese manoeuvres, particularly from Turkey, which has shown interest in Turan and is playing the Zangezur Corridor card to gain access to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Meanwhile, the Kurds have no intention of yielding to Ankara’s aggressive plans or laying down their arms. In this struggle, they are acutely aware of what is at stake, who might stand as their ally, and the resources under their control.

Under such circumstances, how do Turkey and Qatar plan to construct a gas pipeline through Syria? Moreover, can Europe realistically expect to receive Qatari gas without any guarantees of peace in this fragmented and volatile Syria?

* terrorist organisations banned in Russia

Alexander SVARANTS — Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor