The Kurdish question is still central to Turkish expansion in Syria. In Rojava Ankara is butting heads with US and Israeli interests.

In following this path, Türkiye, having entered into provocative cooperation with the United States, actually failed the Russian initiative to restore relations with the Assad regime, putting forward unacceptable conditions for Damascus, particularly refusing to withdraw its troops from the occupied Syrian provinces. By relying on the Syrian opposition’s military operation to overthrow the Assad regime, which was in line with the interests of the United States and Israel, Türkiye found the arguments to convince Russia, and then Iran, not to enter into a military conflict with the rebels and to stop supporting Assad. In fact, the Astana peace process of negotiations, involving Russia, Türkiye and Iran, has entered a crisis state.

In this regard, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, in an interview with French TV, noted that “Mr. Putin has stayed in power long enough to evolve from a tactical administrator to a strategic thinker. I think he knows what is important, what is less important, what can be invested on, what is to be continued, what is not. I think in this case, he has made his calculations and decided not to go ahead anymore”.

President V. V. Putin, of course, thinks strategically. The non-intervention of Russian military bases in Syria against the HTS* attack on Damascus, while completely demoralising the Assad army, was obviously a justified step for Russia. However, Fidan is unlikely to think strategically if Türkiye, hoping for an alliance with the United States, hopes to take control of the situation in a divided Syria and finally solve its own problems (e.g. the Kurds).

Turkish expectations after betting on al-Jolani

In December, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Director of the National Intelligence Organisation Ibrahim Kalin promptly visited Damascus to negotiate with the new rebel government. Türkiye, actively supporting HTS* leader al-Jolani, believes that the West should lift sanctions against Syria in order to re-establish economic life and return refugees, and that it is necessary to restore the territorial integrity of Syria.

Ankara’s key task in Syria remains the issue of cleansing the north of the country from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and PKK.

Türkiye wants to delineate spheres of influence in Syria with the United States. Ankara is particularly concerned about the sole US control of large oil and gas fields in Syrian provinces with a bet on the Kurdish political structure of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Finally, Ankara publicly advocates for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from southwestern Syria and the restoration of the terms of the 1974 agreement on the Golan Heights.

Following a visit to Damascus on December 22, Fidan stressed that Ankara will seek from the UN to reverse recognising HTS* as a terrorist organisation, since for 10 years the West and Türkiye have not noticed signs of terrorism in their activities.

One can only wonder on what basis the UN made such a decision. And what, then, made Russia recognise HTS* as a terrorist structure?

For many years, Türkiye has advocated for the resignation of Assad and the establishment of an inclusive government in Damascus with the participation of ‘good’ Syrian opposition forces. Will HTS* be able to propose such a government?

Until transparent national elections for a new government have been held in Syria, the international community, having recognised the power of the rebels, is actually creating a global precedent and legal lawlessness. It then turns out that in any other corner of the world, the armed opposition, having overthrown the legitimate government, can be recognised by international law.

At the same time, the West, represented by EU leader Ursula von der Leyen, is speculatively linking its attitude towards the leader of HTS* and the topic of lifting sanctions from Syria, as well as the issue of allocating multi-billion-dollar financial assistance to Türkiye, with the topic of banning Russian military bases in Syria, demanding that Ankara resolve this issue with the new government in Damascus.

In December, HTS* leader al-Jolani gave an interview to the British BBC. His answers showed that he is rather prepared politically. Jolani considers it important for Israeli troops to withdraw from Syria, but how this should be done remains unknown. He recognises the military fatigue and weakness of the current Syria, which is not capable of militarily restoring its former borders. The head of HTS* cited several arguments, including respect for the interests of Israel, the elimination of the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria, as well as the refusal of the new authorities in Damascus to have a military alliance with Tehran.

From this opinion it follows that al-Jolani only sees the problem of territorial occupation by Israel in southern Syria, but not by Türkiye in the northwest and the United States in the northeast. He does not support the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip and opposes Iran and Hezbollah in light of religious differences between Sunnis and Shiites.

Regarding the fate of Russian military bases in Syria, al-Jolani gave an evasive answer: on the one hand, he believes that the long history of friendly relations between Syria and the USSR/Russia cannot be severed overnight (the question arises: after what time then?), on the other hand, the new authorities in Damascus are negotiating with Russia on a strategy for subsequent relations and the fate of the Russian bases in Tartus and Hmeimim. It follows from this that the relations of the new Syrian authorities with Russia depend not on the position of Damascus, but on its patron, Ankara.

Moscow’s position on Kurdish separatism

Moscow, represented by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, reiterated that it shares Ankara’s concern about Kurdish separatism. However, with this response Lavrov did not at all say that Russia supports the military operation of Türkiye and the new Syrian authorities against the Syrian Kurds. At the same time, Russia rejects the speculative position of the United States on using the Kurdish issue for another escalation in the region and solving its economic problems.

Ankara can, of course, offer Russia a deal providing for the preservation of its military bases in Syria with the expectation of Russian military support for the elimination of Kurdish forces in the north of Syria. Moscow is, however, unlikely to consent to this. It has already expressed its political position against the Kurdish manipulation of the United States.

Which solutions to the Kurdish question in Syria does Ankara have left?

Türkiye adheres to tough diplomacy vis-à-vis the Syrian Kurdistan region. Ankara does not rule out a military solution to the issue. Perhaps this means another military operation to occupy the north-western provinces of Syria with the total elimination of hotbeds and strongholds of the Kurdish resistance under the pretence of combatting international terrorism. Perhaps the Turks are using the experience of the Israelis against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, i.e. the combined use of combat aircraft (including UAVs), artillery, armoured vehicles and special forces.

However, such a large-scale invasion of the Turkish army in Syria is likely to provoke a negative reaction from part of the international community (primarily the United States, Israel and Iran). If the United States and Israel ally against Türkiye with the involvement of other NATO countries, Iran will take anti-Turkish measures, considering Ankara’s obvious anti-Iranian position in the context of the overthrow of the Assad regime.

Türkiye also does not rule out the option of a joint operation with HTS* against the Kurds in Syria. In this case, both Türkiye and HTS* will come under attack from the above-mentioned external forces (along with accusations of their terrorist nature).

The third option boils down to Türkiye creating a 300,000-strong Syrian army under the control of al-Jolani and conducting an anti-Kurdish operation via Damascus. However, it will take time to create a 300,000-strong army and external controllers may have differing views.

In all cases, Türkiye will have to face a group of serious challenges related to the Kurdish problem, the forceful solution of which will be rather ineffective. Ignoring Russia’s opinion and interests in the Middle East is fraught with irretrievable losses for Türkiye. It will be extremely difficult for Erdogan to overcome the US-Israeli position without Moscow’s support.

Thus, the Turkish ‘Syrian campaign’ has created new contradictions for Türkiye itself. The United States is hardly a stabilising factor in this case.

* Organisation banned in the Russian Federation

Alexander SVARANTS — Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor