Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has insisted that Georgia will not allow itself to be “Ukrainized,” as his Western-backed opponents encouraged a mass mobilization.

The political fallout has been enormous. Outgoing President Salome Zourabichvili, who hails from France, rejected the legitimacy of the new parliament, insisting she would remain in office despite the fact that elections are scheduled for December. In response, the ruling Georgian Dream party, which comfortably won the parliamentary elections, announced that new presidential elections would proceed as planned.

The protests are not just about internal politics—they also signal a broader geopolitical struggle, with Georgia at the crossroads of the Russian-Western rivalry.

Election Results and Protests

A few weeks after the Georgian Dream party’s victory in the October elections, Kobakhidze announced a freeze on EU accession negotiations until 2028, fueling protests across the country. Critics immediately accused the ruling party, which they label as “pro-Russian,” of undermining Georgia’s European future. This accusation has been leveled against the government, even though many of the opposition parties, funded by Western NGOs, have long pushed for Georgia to fall in line with Western powers.

Both President Zourabichvili and former President Mikhail Saakashvili, staunch pro-Western figures, quickly led the charge against the election results, calling them fraudulent and part of a “Russian special operation.” Zourabichvili stated, “Recognizing these elections is the same as accepting Russia’s entry here and Georgia’s subordination to Russia.” Such rhetoric has been repeated by others in the opposition, who insist that Georgia’s future is tied to Western Europe, not Russia.

Despite the claims of fraud, the international community did not back up the opposition’s accusations. Western governments have called for investigations into alleged electoral violations but have stopped short of formally rejecting the results. In fact, the European Parliament – which is relatively toothless – was the only entity to refuse to recognize the elections, even calling for sanctions on Georgia’s leadership.

Meanwhile Azerbaijan, Armenia, Hungary, Türkiye, and China congratulated the ruling party on their victory. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov emphasized that Russia does not interfere in its neighbor’s internal affairs and urged others similarly. “[This is ] the choice of the Georgian people  – it’s crucial that no third parties interfere in the results of this election,” he said.

Overall, according to OSCE observers, the voting process went smoothly, with media reports indicating only a few major incidents. However, following the outcry from the election losers, the Central Election Commission decided to recount the ballots from five precincts in each electoral district for data verification. The recount confirmed the initial results.

But this did not stop the opposition.

Protests and Violent Clashes

The protests reached a new intensity over the week. Some 20,000 demonstrators gathered in Tbilisi on the evening of the announcement, and the rallies have spread to other cities, including Poti, Rustavi, Telavi, and Kutaisi.

Despite Kobakhidze’s firm stance against ‘Ukrainization,’ the opposition remains steadfast, demanding new elections with international supervision. “The only negotiations we will hold with the government will be about conducting new elections with the assistance of international observers,” said opposition MP Giorgi Vashadze.

However, under Georgian law, a repeat election can only be called if the original vote is invalidated or if no party receives at least 5% of the votes. The opposition’s call for new elections is therefore unlikely to succeed.

The opposition has little means to influence the government, due to a lack of power and administrative resources, Dr Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia sector at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has told RT.

“Firstly, the opposition does not hold a majority in parliament and can only block initiatives that require a constitutional majority. Therefore, they have very limited ability to influence government decisions. Secondly, regarding public influence, the protests have proven ineffective. The opposition lacks supporters, energy, and substantial backing from the West,” Pritchin claimed.

Even with active support from the EU and US, the opposition would still struggle to alter the situation in the country or influence public sentiment, Pritchin believes, since the October election results are convincing and have been recognized by international observers.

The Future of Georgia’s Geopolitical Alignment

Prime Minister Kobakhidze has repeatedly emphasized that Georgia’s future lies in Euro-Atlantic integration, but recent statements suggest that the country’s path is far more complicated. He has voiced the hope that it will be ready for EU membership by 2030, but his government also sees strategic partnerships with Russia and China as important parts of Georgia’s future. “We have very important foreign policy priorities, and the main one is of course, Euro-Atlantic integration,” he said, although this is tempered with a desire for improved relations with Russia.

The conflict between Georgia’s domestic political forces and the West over EU membership is exacerbated by the pressure from Western powers, particularly the EU and the US, to align more closely with them against Moscow. While Georgia has made moves to engage with Russia diplomatically, tensions remain high over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Georgia aims to reintegrate. They are recognized as independent states by Russia.

In contrast, the opposition, backed by Western powers, wants Georgia to lean decisively toward the EU and NATO, even at the risk of souring relations with Moscow. With a fragmented electorate and deeply polarized political factions, the current protests are unlikely to end without a significant political shift—either through reform or a potential collapse of the Georgian Dream government.

On November 30, the US suspended its strategic partnership with Georgia, citing “anti-democratic” actions by the ruling party. The State Department claimed that by halting the EU accession process, Georgian Dream has made the country more vulnerable to Russia.

The following day, on December 1, the new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, the former Prime Minister of Estonia, indicated that the EU might impose sanctions on Georgia due to the harsh crackdown on protests..

Follwing the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, the Georgian authorities asserted that a “global war party” wanted to open a “second front” against Russia in Georgia. Former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili claimed this was the goal of the opposition and its “ideological allies from the Ukrainian government”.

As the election campaign progressed, this rhetoric intensified. Officials didn’t mention the EU or US, although a few days before the elections, former Georgian PM Bidzina Ivanishvili stated that a senior official from “one of the countries” had suggested to Garibashvili that he should start a war against Russia.

Improving relations with Russia—strained since the 2008 war over Abkhazia and South Ossetia—became a key theme of the election campaign. Kobakhidze identified the normalization of bilateral relations as a key priority for the coming years, while Ivanishvili expressed confidence that Georgia would “find the strength to apologize” to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, territories it lost following the 2008 conflict begun by the UMP’s Saakashvili. Georgia’s ultimate goal is to reintegrate the unrecognized republics.

However, after the elections, the moderately pro-Russian rhetoric in Georgia gave way to a colder tone. Kobakhidze stated that the country doesn’t plan to restore diplomatic relations with Russia, citing that “10% of our territory is occupied”. “We have very important foreign policy priorities, and the main one is of course, Euro-Atlantic integration,” he said, noting that relations with the EU will be reset in “intensive mode” starting in 2025.

Ivanishvili, one of Georgia’s richest men, elaborated on the matter and said that ties with the West would improve once the conflict in Ukraine concludes, which he believes could happen soon. However, until then, Georgia will staunchly defend its interests and avoid confrontation with Russia, even at the potential cost of its relationship with the EU.

Stanislav Pritchin told RT that Georgian authorities will pursue a balanced approach in international relations. They will strive to build pragmatic ties with Russia while keeping the door open for negotiations with Western nations.

“Russia-Georgia relations are likely to proceed along the same lines as they do now. Indeed, there may be attempts to deepen bilateral ties and establish more regular political contacts. But for now, Georgia isn’t ready to resume diplomatic relations or fully cooperate in economics and other fields. A lot will depend on the ability of Western countries to adjust [their position] and offer something in light of the new conditions, such as unfreezing EU membership talks with Georgia,” the expert noted.

It is unlikely that Western countries consider a change in the situation in Georgia as a realistic scenario from the outside. Georgian Dream has not backed down on any fundamental issues, has confidently won the elections and continues to maintain its position even under threat of being removed from the list of EU candidate countries and likely mass protests.

A Country at a Crossroads

Georgia’s future remains uncertain, caught between the competing interests of Russia and the West. The ongoing protests reflect a deep division within the country: one side sees Georgia’s path tied to Russia, while the other pushes for integration with the EU. The ruling Georgian Dream party may have won the elections, but the opposition, though lacking significant public support, is fighting to keep Georgia on the path of its backers.

This political crisis has become a critical juncture in the country’s history. The ultimate direction Georgia takes will not only determine the future of its sovereignty but also shape its role in the broader geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West. Will Tbilisi fully embrace a Western future, or will it forge a path of pragmatism that acknowledges Moscow’s influence? The outcome remains uncertain, and the consequences will resonate far beyond Georgia.