Direct arms supplies from South Korea to Kyiv are a red line for Moscow, something Seoul is fully aware of. For this reason, despite pressure from the United States and speculation surrounding Moscow’s cooperation with Pyongyang, Ukrainian officials once again returned home empty-handed.
Visit Context
To date, South Korea has exported weapons to Poland and supplied the United States with 500,000 units of 155-mm artillery shells (some of which are believed to have ended up in Ukraine, either with or without Seoul’s knowledge). However, South Korea refrains from directly supplying arms to Kyiv, citing its long-standing policy of avoiding arms sales to countries involved in conflicts.
Washington has been attempting to pressure Seoul into providing arms to Ukraine for some time now. Strategies include direct demands from officials like NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg, special envoys such as Olena Zelenska, speculative articles in US media alleging that Seoul has “already” secretly supplied weapons to Kyiv, and even attempts to bring South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol to places like Bucha and Irpin. Despite this, South Korea’s leadership has so far shown resilience, although such firmness has its limits.
However, if we put aside the hype, the new series of statements by the ROK leadership, as before, allowed for twofold interpretations. We are considering this option (i.e., we may or may not make a decision), and the scope of our response will depend on the cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. In this context, Yun said on 7 November 2024 that he did not rule out the possibility of providing arms to Ukraine: “depending on the level of North Korea’s involvement, we will gradually adjust our support strategy in stages.”
On 19 November, Ukraine’s ambassador to South Korea, Dmytro Ponomarenko, announced that a Ukrainian delegation led by Defence Minister Rustem Umerov planned to visit Seoul. The agenda included discussions on North Korea’s military activities, the potential deployment of South Korean observers to Ukraine, and possible arms supplies. The Ukrainian ambassador expressed gratitude for South Korea’s support while emphasising the need to expand it, particularly in the area of defence supplies. He highlighted Ukraine’s interest in acquiring air defence systems, including radars and defensive missiles. President Zelensky himself had previously made a similar request during a phone conversation with President Yoon, stressing the need for artillery and air defence missiles.
On 24 November 2024, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Andrey Yuryevich Rudenko, gave an interview to the TASS news agency, in which South Korea was once again warned:
– With regard to Seoul’s linking of its potential arms supplies to Kyiv with the development of cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, such an approach may lead to extremely negative consequences. It is evident that the Ukrainian conflict has no relation whatsoever to the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, the South Korean authorities, supported by their NATO “like-minded partners”, continue to artificially fuel the narrative of North Korean military personnel being present in the area of the Special Military Operation. This is being done to increase pressure on Pyongyang through military means, acting in close partnership with the North Atlantic Alliance. This, in turn, aligns with the objectives of the ‘collective West,’ which aims to involve the Republic of Korea in its overarching efforts to arm the Zelensky regime, thereby making South Korea complicit in the crimes committed by Western actors. Seoul must understand that the potential use of South Korean weapons to kill Russian citizens will irreparably destroy relations between our countries.
On 26 November, on the sidelines of a meeting of senior diplomats from the Group of Seven, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Andriy Sibiga, met with South Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cho Tae-yong. Sibiga expressed hope that a special envoy of the Zelensky regime would visit South Korea in the near future to “discuss the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia for use in the war against Kyiv”. In response, Minister Cho confirmed that his government would take phased and practical steps in line with emerging security threats and progress in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
Visit Outcomes
On 27 November, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol held a closed-door meeting with Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem Umerov. The main topic of discussion was Russian-North Korean military cooperation. The outcome of the discussion was summarised by South Korean media as follows:
– the parties “exchanged intelligence regarding North Korean military units dispatched to Russia.” The special envoy of President Zelensky provided a detailed account of the current situation and its evolving trends — specifically, the narrative Kyiv seeks to project to global leaders.
– an agreement was reached to continue exchanging information related to the deployment of North Korean troops in connection with the conflict in Ukraine, the possible transfer of Russian military technologies, and the supply of weapons.
– Kyiv is counting on strengthening security cooperation with Seoul. South Korea and Ukraine will maintain close communication on this issue with the United States, “as both the Biden administration and the team of President-elect Donald Trump are responding in unison to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.”
– According to Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea and Ukraine intend to develop effective countermeasures to address the growing security threats posed by military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
It is known that after the negotiations concluded, the Ukrainian delegation held separate meetings with Shin Won-sik, the Chief of the National Security Office of the Presidential Administration, and Kim Yong-hyun, the Minister of Defence of South Korea. However, both sides ignored journalists’ questions regarding the potential supply of South Korean weapons to Kyiv. Special attention was drawn to Umerov’s silence on the matter.
Moreover, citing high-ranking sources, South Korean media reported that Ukraine had requested not assistance but paid supplies of air defence systems and ammunition from South Korea. Even this request was refused by Seoul.
On 28 November, Umerov stated in his Telegram channel that “close cooperation between South Korea and Ukraine will significantly enhance the security of the peoples of both countries.” However, he once again refrained from mentioning whether the issue of supplying South Korean weapons to Ukraine was discussed.
On the same day, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging EU member states to actively engage with South Korea to achieve a “shift in its stance” on supporting Ukraine and providing it with “substantial military assistance.”
What This Means
According to South Korean experts, several factors influenced the decision-making process:
- a reluctance to damage relations with Moscow. Although it is likely that Yoon Suk-yeol will eventually yield to external pressure, this time South Korea refrained from announcing a change in its policy. Pragmatism, awareness of the potentially severe consequences of a Russian response, and hopes that relations with Moscow will return to normal “once everything is over” all played a role.
- the heavy workload of South Korea’s defence industry. The sector is already dealing with sufficient orders for years to come. President Yoon is actively promoting arms trade with the goal of making South Korea the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter. Ukraine, however, is not regarded as a particularly reliable partner.
- the potential influence of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Trump may seek a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, a possibility that must be factored into South Korea’s decision-making.
- finally, against the backdrop of the internal political crisis, such a decision may cause criticism of the opposition, which is already rocking the boat.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences