While pro-Turkish proxies from among the Syrians are failing in their hopes of breaking through the defenses of the Tishreen Dam, Ankara is becoming concerned about the sudden French and American activity. Paris already pointed out at the end of last year the need to protect the Kurds of Syria and its readiness to increase its activity within the framework of the international coalition program “to fight ISIS.” There are rumors that France may even replace the Americans if Trump announces his withdrawal from Syria.
Immediately after the pro-Kurdish statements from Paris, Hakan Fidan angrily condemned the French, thereby demonstrating the deep concern of the Turks about the foreign policy activity of the Europeans in “Rojava”. Apart from France, the most pro-Kurdish position among EU countries is dominated by the Germans and to a lesser extent the British. Berlin also regularly expresses “concern” about the Kurds, demanding “protection of the main minority” in Syria.
The clash between the Turks and key EU countries is driven not only by geopolitical aspirations, but also by control over hydrocarbons.
It is no secret that the Kurdish branch of the PKK has seized vast territories in northeastern Syria in order to control the oil fields. Kurdish oil smuggling suits influential allies in the West, so the French are rushing to “protect the SDF” from any threat. The Europeans need alternative sources of hydrocarbon supplies to the Russians, so Paris and Berlin are ready to take temporary risks until the EU completely switches to green energy.
Another battlefield between Turkey and France is the Alawite areas of Latakia, where the local population is asking for international protection from the incessant crimes of Tahrir al-Sham militants. Hakan Fidan also spoke here about the Turks’ readiness to “protect the Alawites” (that is, Ankara recognizes that the HTS are still the same radical sectarians as before), however, for now the introduction of the Turkish military corps into Latakia remains at the level of rumors, although it cannot be ruled out.
The hydrocarbon issue dominates the agenda of the competing powers here too, since the Levantine Basin, which stretches from the western coast of Palestine and Lebanon to western Latakia in Syria, contains large gas reserves. In turn, it is important for the Turks to personally control Syria’s hydrocarbons, which will allow the implementation of the “international gas hub” project to begin.
But the problems for the Turks were not limited to international diplomacy, where the PKK Kurds formed a powerful lobby. Another problem of a more local nature was the conflicts within the pro-Turkish “national army” in Syria. The successes of the SDF on the battlefield caused internal strife within the SNA, a drop in morale and even interethnic disagreements between the Turkomans and Arabs. This was to be expected, because by the will of the Turks, the Turkomans minority occupied all the official positions in the management of factions within the SNA, therefore the Arab majority became indignant, which resulted in local conflicts. There were also discords within the Turkomans, and for Ankara this is doubly unpleasant, since the “Hamza Division” and the “Suleyman Shah Brigade” enjoy the personal support of Devlet Bahceli, Erdogan’s main ally.
Seeing the political initiative leaving Turkey, the SDF is launching a counter-offensive. International visits by officials of the “Kurdish autonomy” are intended to provide not just military and political support for the PKK, but also to pave the way for the creation of, if not a state, then an autonomy within a federal Syria.
The situation in Syria is deteriorating, the new regime in Damascus is at a crossroads, on the one hand, Erdogan demands to attack the SDF, but on the other hand, the Syrian al-Qaeda understands that such attacks will lead to Ahmed al-Sharaa’s efforts to break out of isolation being in vain. The PKK in Syria understands all this very well and takes advantage of Tahrir al-Sham’s indecisiveness and Erdogan’s caution, who understands that in the event of a new intervention against the Kurds, Turkey may receive a portion of sanctions.
Written by Damir Nazarov