Venezuela’s Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino on August 26 announced a “significant” drone deployment as well as naval patrols along the country’s Caribbean coast, including “larger vessels further north in our territorial waters.”
The move came as the administration of United States President Donald Trump continues to escalate against Venezuela, using the problem of drug trafficking as a pretext.
The U.S. designated Venezuelan criminal group Tren de Aragua and a number of Mexican drug cartels as global terrorist organizations last February, and later doubled the reward for the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from to $50 million.
Maduro was accused by the Trump administration of being “the world’s biggest drug trafficker” and of working with cartels to smuggle fentanyl-laced cocaine.
Earlier this month, the U.S. dispatched a 4000-strong naval group, including an amphibious group, multiple guided missile destroyers, a nuclear attack submarine and several naval patrol aircraft, to Latin America and the Caribbean on a counter-cartel mission.
On August 26, a U.S. source told AFP that the Trump administration was dispatching two more warships to the Caribbean to crack down on drug cartels.
Maduro has accused Trump of attempting to effect regime change and launched a drive to enlist up thousands of members in the Bolivarian Militia of Venezuela.
Responding to Maduro’s call to respond to “outlandish threats” by the U.S., thousands of people from all walks of life lined up in Caracas over the weekend to join the militia.
While Venezuela is preparing for a possible confrontation with the U.S., it has also stepped up efforts to counter drug trafficking in a what appears to be an attempt to prevent the Trump administration from using
On August 25, Venezuela’s Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello announced the deployment of 15,000 troops to bolster security in Zulia and Tachira states, which border Colombia.
“Here, we do fight drug trafficking, here, we do fight drug cartels on all fronts,” he said, announcing the seizure of 53 tons of drugs so far this year.
Padrino announced on the very next day that an ongoing operation in Venezuela’s northeastern corner had resulted in the dismantling of shipyards where criminals intended “to manufacture semisubmersibles and boats to transport drugs by sea” to markets in Europe and North America.
While a U.S. attack on Venezuela seems highly unlikely, the oil-rich country has every right to be extremely cautious about the naval buildup near its shores.
The U.S. did not recognize Maduro’s past two election victories. In addition, Trump floated the idea of a military intervention in Venezuela during his first term.
In response to Washington’s deployment of warships capable of conducting surgical strikes with Tomahawk missiles off Venezuela’s coast and the bounty for President Maduro’s arrest, Caracas activated the 4.5-million-strong Bolivarian militia. This branch of Venezuela’s military, composed of poorly trained and lightly armed volunteers, is the least combat-ready component of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces. The military’s main branches, the army, navy and air force, with 123,000 active personnel, are on high alert. Caracas sent 15,000 military personnel to the border with Colombia, ostensibly to fight drug trafficking and bolster security.
Venezuela, unlike Washington’s last regional interventions in Grenada and Panama, possesses a strong military. There is a blue-water navy operating seven frigates and one submarine, a 63,000-strong army equipped with main battle tanks, and an air force flying modern jet fighters. Indeed, Venezuela’s military is ranked as the seventh most powerful in Latin America, ahead of Ecuador but behind Peru. Despite those credible numbers, if Washington commits U.S. forces to combat operations in Venezuela it will win an overwhelming tactical victory against a military ill-prepared to fight a medium to high intensity war.
A U.S. invasion of Venezuela, despite leading to an unqualified military victory, is fraught with extreme risk. The greatest threat is that U.S. troops will not be welcomed in Venezuela or Latin America. There is a long history of distrust borne of Washington’s brutal regional military interventions and coups, which destabilized many countries, leading to cruel military dictatorships that persecuted civil society. In many instances, where U.S. ground forces were deployed in Latin America, the troops behaved poorly, breeding considerable hostility among local communities. These feelings are aggravated by Washington’s lack of positive regional engagement since 2016 and President Trump’s decision to slash aid.
President Maduro will use that sentiment, along with Chavist Venezuela’s anti-imperialist credentials, to whip up hate and anti-American resistance in Latin America. There is already a resounding response to Maduro’s call for citizens to respond to U.S. threats; thousands of Venezuelans are volunteering for the Bolivarian Militia. For these reasons, after invading Venezuela, Washington could find itself fighting a grueling, long-term asymmetric war.
In a country that is double the size of Iraq, any invasion and subsequent occupation to rebuild a devastated Venezuela will require a massive number of troops. Estimates vary, but reliable sources point to the deployment of more than 100,000 U.S. troops with supporting naval, air and logistical elements, with double or more of that number required if Washington’s experience in Iraq is any indication. At its peak the U.S. deployed 170,300 personnel who struggled to control Iraq’s territory and defeat an ideologically driven anti-American multiparty insurgency.
Opposition to a U.S. invasion is considerable and growing. Mexico, Cuba and Colombia have rejected the deployment of U.S. military assets near Venezuela. President Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico stated she was opposed to any sort of military intervention in Latin America. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro warned a U.S. invasion risks turning Venezuela into another Syria, where a savage 14-year multiparty civil war spawned terrorist movements and displaced over 13 million refugees. President Petro was quoted by major Colombian newspaper El Tiempo as saying:
“The gringos are in the pot, they think that by invading Venezuela they solve their problem, they put Venezuela in the case of Syria, only with the problem that they are dragging the same thing into Colombia,”
The Andean country’s leader further cautioned that such a conflict could spill over into Colombia, dragging the long-standing U.S. ally into the war. Various leftist guerrillas still fighting in Colombia, including FARC dissidents and the National Liberation Army (ELN), potentially will join the conflict to boost their flagging popularity, territory and influence. Even if those insurgents do not become directly involved, they will emerge as important conduits for arms, training and logistical support to Venezuela’s resistance. Consequently, they strengthened their power base in Colombia and Venezuela, while bolstering recruitment and income. This will further destabilize a fragile Colombia a country recovering from a lengthy multi-party civil war. These possible outcomes highlight the considerable risk of regional contagion and destabilization that U.S. military intervention in Venezuela will cause.
